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Under the Direction of Michael J. Beran, PhD 
 
ABSTRACT 
Face pareidolia is the misperception of a face in an inanimate object and is a common 
error of the face detection system in humans. Whereas there are many similarities in how humans 
and nonhuman animals such as monkeys perceive and respond to faces, it is still unknown as to 
whether other species also perceive this illusion. I presented a novel computerized task to 
capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and pre-school aged 
children (Homo sapiens). This task trained subjects to choose faces over nonface images, and 
then presented pareidolia images with nonface images. All species selected faces most often on 
trials that included face images. However, only children selected pareidolia images at levels 
above chance. These results suggest that while children do perceive face pareidolia, monkeys do 
not. These species differences could be due to human-unique experiences that result in a 
sensitivity to extracting face-like patterns in objects. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Purpose of the Study  
Face perception is a fundamental cognitive process that underlies social interactions and 
provides information such as an individual’s identity, sex, age, and emotional state. Humans can 
detect faces rapidly and without effort, an ability demonstrated by rapid saccade speed (Crouzet 
et al., 2010; Rousselet et al., 2003), captured attention (Langton et al., 2008; Theeuwes & Van 
der Stigchel, 2006), and search efficiency (Hershler et al., 2010; Hershler & Hochstein, 2005). 
Even from infancy, humans spend more time looking at face-like than nonface like patterns 
(Crouzet et al., 2010; Farroni et al., 2005; Goren et al., 1975). The importance in being able 
rapidly to detect and recognize faces is also apparent by the specialized cortical regions 
responsible for processing facial stimuli (Haxby et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1997; Kanwisher 
& Yovel, 2006; Tsao & Livingstone, 2008). Despite their proficiency in detecting and 
recognizing faces, humans are still prone to perceptual disruptions during face processing. For 
example, when faces are inverted, the ability to recognize and discriminate faces from each other 
is greatly hindered (Yin, 1969). So, despite being an integral and essential human behavior, 
organizing and processing facial information is not an 
infallible process. It is in these errors, however, that we 
can better understand what it is about faces that causes us 
to respond so strongly to them. For example, does the 
basic configuration of eyes and mouth warrant these 
behaviors across species, or must there be relevant social 
and featural information as well?  
Figure 1. Examples of face 
pareidolia 
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An example of a face processing error that is not well understood is the phenomenon of 
recognizing a face when one is not present – an illusion known as face pareidolia (Kato & 
Mugitani, 2015; Mamiya et al., 2016; Proverbio & Galli, 2016). Even in the most non-living of 
stimuli such as collections of objects, or in other highly recognizable stimuli, such as foods, the 
organization of certain features still leads to a sense that one is looking at a face (Figure 1). 
Perhaps one of the reasons humans are so susceptible to this illusion is due to their exceptional 
ability to detect and recognize faces, resulting in a sensitivity to the configural pattern of a face. 
Alternatively, humans may experience this illusion due to an increased tendency to 
anthropomorphize objects, especially in media. Face pareidolia is a common human 
phenomenon, with notable examples including the perception of Jesus’s face on a piece of toast 
or seeing a face in the clouds (Liu et al., 2014). Currently, much of the research investigating this 
illusion employs neurological measures including event-related potentials (ERPs), functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), or magnetoencephalography (MEG) to assess whether 
areas typically activated by viewing faces are also activated by the perception of face pareidolia 
(Hadjikhani et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2014; Proverbio & Galli, 2016; Wardle et al., 2017). For 
example, illusory faces have been found to activate the fusiform face area (FFA) – an area 
typically associated with face processing (Liu et al., 2014; Wardle et al., 2017). A handful of 
studies have used behavioral measures to assess this illusion. For example, Takahashi and 
Watanabe (2013) found that examples of face pareidolia elicited a gaze shift, indicating that 
humans allocate attentional resources to the perception of illusory faces similarly to how we 
allocate attentional resources to real faces. In another experiment, humans used a 200-point 
slider scale and consistently rated the pareidolia images as more “face-like” than control images 
(Taubert et al., 2017). A few experiments, described in more detail later, have studied whether 
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this illusion is present in young children or infants, using looking-time measures and 
categorization tasks (Beran et al., 2017; Kato & Mugitani, 2015; Kobayashi et al., 2012). 
Overall, this phenomenon appears to be well-established in humans and has added to a better 
understanding of the human visual processing system. However, very little is known about 
whether, or to what extent, nonhuman animals, such as monkeys, perceive this illusion – despite 
an established shared sensitivity to faces (for a review see Parr, 2011a).  
Studying face pareidolia in nonhuman primates presents a unique opportunity to 
understand better the perceptual processing of these images and whether these images elicit the 
prioritization of certain processing strategies across species. For instance, face pareidolia could 
represent an error of preferential processing strategies pertinent to looking at faces rooted in 
many primate species’ sensitivities to seeing faces frequently. Therefore, studying this illusion in 
multiple species will provide a more complete understanding of face processing and elucidate 
whether the misperception of illusory faces is unique to humans or an error of a shared face-
processing strategy common across multiple species of primates. 
1.1.1  Global versus local processing in humans 
A critical part of early perceptual processing of visual stimuli that underlies face and 
object recognition involves the integration of individual features. Adult humans tend to 
discriminate environmental stimuli by attending to the global features, rather than the individual, 
or local, features (Broadbent, 1977; Kimchi, 1992; Lamb & Robertson, 1988; Navon, 1977, 
1981; Neiworth et al., 2006). For example, Navon (1977) used stimuli made up of small letters 
arranged in the shape of a larger letter. Adults responded faster to the global form (the larger 
letter) rather than the local properties (the small letters that formed the large letter). This is 
described today as having a global precedence. This processing strategy is aligned with Gestalt 
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Theory, which states that a stimulus is perceived as a ‘sum of its parts’ and often in its “best 
form” (for a review, see Melnick, 1997). In fact, our tendency to group stimulus elements in this 
way has resulted in several perceptual errors, including various visual illusions. For example, in 
the Solitaire illusion, same-colored items on the periphery of an array appear less numerous 
because they lack the cluster-grouping of the other-colored inner items, despite these items being 
equal in number (Frith & Frith, 1972; Wertheimer, 1938). Misperceptions in size occur in the 
Delboeuf and Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusions, when identical central circles appear to be 
different in size due to our grouping of all the stimulus elements (Aglioti et al., 1995; Bondarko 
& Semenov, 2004; Cooper & Weintraub, 1970; Coren & Enns, 1993; Delboeuf, 1892; 
Ebbinghaus, 1902; Jaeger et al., 2014; McClain et al., 2014; Nicolas, 1995; Van Ittersum & 
Wansink, 2012; Weintraub, 1979; Weintraub & Schneck, 1986). Our tendency to process stimuli 
globally has led to decades of research on human face processing and the intricacies of how our 
perceptual system organizes faces into a coherent, whole form – also known as holistic face 
processing (for reviews see Maurer et al., 2002; Richler & Gauthier, 2014). In line with global 
and Gestalt processing, humans group individual facial features (the eyes, nose, and mouth) into 
what we effortlessly recognize as a holistic face (Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tanaka & Simonyi, 
2016; Taubert et al., 2011; Wagemans et al., 2012). 
Global perceptual processing is largely the outcome of a developmental progression. As 
they grow older, children become more efficient at processing stimuli globally than by their 
individual parts. Whereas several studies suggest that local perceptual processing is the dominant 
mode of processing in young children, other studies suggest that young children equally 
discriminate and replicate by hand-drawing hierarchical stimuli based on their global and local 
properties, and that by the age of 8 years an adult-like global-dominant processing strategy 
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emerges (Carey & Diamond, 1977; De Lillo et al., 2005; Dukette & Stiles, 1996, 2001; Elkind et 
al., 1964; Nayar et al., 2015; Poirel et al., 2008). For example, four-year-old children had more 
difficulty than six-year old children in integrating individual parts of a spatial array into a 
coherent whole, but they still demonstrated an ability to do so, and this ability improved with age 
(Dukette & Stiles, 1996). Proximity of local elements within a perceived stimulus plays a large 
role in one’s ability to group those elements into a whole, and this is also seen in the 
developmental literature. In one study, children (ages four and five) showed a global bias only 
when the local elements of the stimuli were densely spaced, but equivalent discrimination was 
seen for global and local properties in sparsely spaced stimuli (Neiworth et al., 2006). When 
distance between elements was increased, 4- and 5-year-old children experienced larger deficits 
than 6- and 8- year-olds in integrating the remaining parts into a coherent whole, whereas older 
children and adults did not (Dukette & Stiles, 2001). Despite this age difference, the younger 
children were still competent in reproducing the global form from memory. Therefore, while the 
efficiency of global processing increases with age, younger children are still proficient 
processing the global features of images. In terms of the perception of face pareidolia, children, 
especially children under five years of age, may be more susceptible than older children and 
adults to interference by local elements and less efficiency in grouping elements together to 
recognize the face-like configuration characteristic of face pareidolia. 
1.1.2 Face perception in humans 
As with hierarchical/compound stimuli discussed earlier, human adults process more 
complex stimuli, such as faces, globally. This is often referred to as holistic face processing 
(Farah et al., 1998; Richler et al., 2011). Maurer and colleagues (2002) described three ways in 
which faces are processed: the detection of a face by the recognition of its first-order features 
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(eyes, nose, mouth, etc.), the integration of these features into a ‘whole,’ and finally the 
discrimination of one face from another based on second-order information (how these features 
are arranged relative to each other and thus, the variance between faces). 
Holistic face processing has been studied with various testing paradigms in the human 
literature. One of the most common is the face inversion effect (Diamond & Carey, 1986; 
Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Yin, 1969). Humans are impaired in their ability to discriminate and 
recognize faces when the faces are inverted or rotated 180 degrees. In other words, the faces’ 
typical second-order properties are altered, and this causes issues in recognition and 
discrimination. Whereas it is still debated as to whether the face inversion effect relies 
completely on second order relational information and how we integrate features into a whole or 
also on individual feature processing as well (Civile et al., 2014, 2016; Diamond & Carey, 1986; 
Rakover & Teucher, 1997; Rhodes et al., 1993), research suggests that the inversion effect is 
largely a result of a holistic face processing strategy for upright faces (Freire et al., 2000; Leder 
& Bruce, 2000; Leder & Carbon, 2006; Rosenthal et al., 2018; Rossion, 2008; Sergent, 1984; 
Van Belle et al., 2010). Further, research on this effect suggests that inversion is specific to faces 
because of our level of expertise and experience attending to faces in our day-to-day lives 
(Diamond & Carey, 1986; Leder & Carbon, 2006; Robbins & McKone, 2007) and because faces 
are “special” to us (Farah et al., 1998; McKone et al., 2007; Yin, 1969). This specialness is 
reflected in our rapid ability to recognize faces holistically and configurationally, so much so that 
they are set apart from other objects (Watson, 2013). Some research suggests that our rapid 
holistic processing of faces is partially contingent on our experience, and thus expertise, with 
specific face categories. For example, the ‘other race effect’ describes an ability to discriminate 
faces of an observer’s own race better than faces of people of other races (e.g., Michel et al., 
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2006). Therefore, face processing is influenced both by the grouping of features into a holistic 
form but also from experience. 
Another way of testing holistic face processing through face inversion is through the 
Thatcher Illusion. This illusion was first demonstrated using pictures of Margaret Thatcher’s 
face, with just the eyes and the mouth inverted – making the face appear ‘grotesque’ (Thompson, 
1980). However, when this ‘Thatcherized’ image was inverted, the unusual orientation of local 
features relative to the whole face is no longer easily detectable. As in the typical face inversion 
effect, holistic processing is impaired when the image is turned upside down, making changes in 
the local features less noticeable compared to when it is presented right side up. Evidence for the 
Thatcher illusion has been shown in humans ranging from infants to adults (Bartlett & Searcy, 
1993; Bertin & Bhatt, 2004; Leder & Carbon, 2006; Utz & Carbon, 2016). 
The composite face effect has also been used to assess holistic face processing. In the 
composite face effect, it is more difficult to identify top halves of a face when they are aligned 
with different bottom halves (Murphy et al., 2017; Young et al., 1987). Holistic processing 
strategies cause us to group these two different halves into a whole, unique face. This creates the 
illusion of a novel face and makes it more difficult to identify the top halves of these composite 
faces. On the other hand, misaligning the halves of the faces disrupts configural/holistic 
processing of the face, making it easier to identify identical top halves of faces in this condition. 
Overall, the composite face effect demonstrates how our tendency to process faces holistically 
can interfere with how we recognize faces. This effect has been well documented in several 
studies with adults  (Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Le Grand et al., 2004; Maurer et al., 2002; 
McKone, 2008; Mondloch et al., 2002; Murphy et al., 2017; Young et al., 1987). 
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For young children, whose efficiency in global processing seem to mature with age, there 
is conflicting evidence as to whether faces conform to this rule. Some research suggests that 
younger children seemed to process faces more by local features rather than the holistic method 
seen in older children and adults (Carey et al., 1980; Carey & Diamond, 1977; Schwarzer, 2000). 
For example, Carey et al. found a face inversion effect in older children, but not in younger 
children, suggesting that holistic face processing, like global processing, is a product of 
development. However, studies that provide evidence for predominantly local processing of 
faces in young children also tended to use larger stimuli (Lundy, 2001; Nakabayashi & Liu, 
2014). As mentioned earlier, children are more likely to respond to the local feature changes 
when stimuli have larger inter-element distances, so larger stimuli might explain some of these 
patters. However, studies that have used smaller (more densely spaced) stimuli tend to report 
holistic face processing in children as young as three (Baenninger, 1994; Flin, 1985; Lundy, 
2001). Therefore, results indicating developmental differences in face processing may be the 
result of insufficient stimulus sets. 
Many studies have reported that young children are, in fact, sensitive and responsive to 
the configurational properties of faces and, thus, are processing faces holistically (Hayden et al., 
2007; McKone & Boyer, 2006; Mondloch et al., 2003; Pascalis et al., 2011; Petrakova et al., 
2018; Quinn & Tanaka, 2009). Schwarzer and colleagues (2007) posited that between 4 and 10 
months of age, infants shift from a featural processing strategy towards a configural face 
processing strategy. Additionally, newborns and infants as young as a few months old have been 
shown to prefer faces that are configurally accurate and upright (Bhatt et al., 2005; Cohen & 
Cashon, 2001; Rose et al., 2008; Slater et al., 2000; Turati et al., 2004). Although it is generally 
weaker than in adults, multiple studies report the face inversion effect in infants and young 
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children (Brace et al., 2001; Joseph et al., 2015; Joseph et al., 2006; McKone & Boyer, 2006; 
Meinhardt-Injac et al., 2014; Rose et al., 2009; Schwarzer, 2000; Tanaka et al., 1998). 
Additionally, the composite face effect appears to be present in children ranging from just a few 
months old to 13 years old (Carey, 1996; Carey & Diamond, 1994; Cassia et al., 2009; de 
Heering et al., 2007; Pellicano & Rhodes, 2003; Susilo et al., 2009; Tanaka et al., 1998; 
although, see Mondloch et al., 2007; Turati et al., 2010 for evidence for developmental 
differences in the inversion effect). Overall, like with nonface stimuli, children are likely able to 
process faces in a global – or holistic – manner. In fact, the special role that faces play and our 
abundant experience with faces may explain why many of these studies find holistic processing 
in children as young as a few months old. However, these studies also suggest that holistic face-
processing in young children may not be fully developed into its adult like form – also consistent 
with what is seen in nonface hierarchical stimuli. Studying face pareidolia in children will 
provide interesting insights into how well they can prioritize a global/holistic processing strategy 
in images that lack the correct facial features over images that contain real facial features but 
lack the correct facial configuration. If children readily perceive and judge pareidolia images as 
face-like, this would indicate that just the configuration of features is enough to trigger a 
response similar to the one elicited by real faces.  
Children, even in infancy, are sensitive to face-like configurations, but few researchers 
have investigated the perception of face pareidolia in children. Kato and Mugitani (2015) used 
looking time to measure whether infants recognized illusory faces made up of ‘blobs.’ Results 
showed that 10 and 12 month old infants looked at the ‘blob’ representing the mouth region more 
often when presented upright than inverted whereas 8-month old infants did not, suggesting that 
older infants perceive the blobs as illusory faces and look to the mouth blob due to an existing 
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sound-mouth association (Kato & Mugitani, 2015). In another study, researchers presented 
Arcimboldo images (portraits of people that are made up of various fruits, vegetables, and plants) 
to infants and found a viewing preference for upright, but not inverted, exemplars (Kobayashi et 
al., 2012). However, it remains unclear whether these responses represent explicit recognition of 
a pattern being “face-like” or an implicit attraction to this particular configuration (without the 
adult-like recognition of it being similar to that of a real face). Alternatively, three- to five-year-
old children were given a categorization task in which they categorized Arcimboldo images as 
faces significantly more often than they did scattered images with no face-like configuration 
(Beran et al., 2017). Therefore, by the age of three children’s holistic processing of faces is 
sophisticated enough to elicit explicit recognition of illusory faces. Despite these promising 
results, it remains unclear the extent to which children can explicitly judge illusory faces as more 
or less face-like, especially with a wider variety of pareidolia images that differ from the 
Arcimboldo portraits. 
1.1.3 Global versus local processing in nonhuman primates 
Studying how nonhuman animals perceive the world has greatly aided our understanding 
of what perceptual mechanisms and phenomenon are common across species or unique to 
humans. Therefore, our knowledge of the developmental progression and perception of face 
pareidolia in humans could be bolstered by studying this illusion in nonhuman animals such as 
monkeys. Comparing how monkeys and humans perceive the world around us can help us to 
understand how perceptual processing strategies differ across the primate phylogeny. For 
example, differences in how monkeys and apes perceive the global and local properties of 
stimuli has provided evidence that a more global-processing strategy has likely developed before 
the emergence of modern humans and helps explain some differences in perceptual errors across 
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species. Alternatively, understanding how primates process some stimuli similarly (like faces), 
can provide useful insight into how experience with stimuli and the importance of certain 
characteristics result in similar phenomena (see the sections below in the face inversion and 
composite effect). Therefore, we can benefit by expanding our study of perception from a 
development perspective and including a comparative approach. Doing so can help disentangle 
the roles of certain perceptual processing strategies as well as how experience may influence the 
perception of visual illusions. In other words, only studying face pareidolia in children does not 
provide a sufficient explanation or understanding of the underlying perceptual processing 
strategies that play a role in illusory face perception. The differences in how children and adults 
perceive hierarchical stimuli are confounded with factors such as experience, development, and 
so on, and those confounds can blur our understanding of how this illusion is truly being 
perceived. Studying face pareidolia in nonhuman primates will serve to clarify inconsistencies 
that remain in the developmental literature and how species differ in the processing of different 
stimulus characteristics. 
Nonhuman primates, like humans, have cortical areas that are made up of face-selective 
neurons responsible for processing information extracted from faces (Ku, Tolias, Logothetis, & 
Goense, 2011; Leopold & Rhodes, 2010; Pinsk et al., 2005; Tsao et al., 2003; Tsao et al., 2008a, 
2008b; Yovel & Freiwald, 2013; see Parr, 2011, for a review). Some of these areas are sensitive 
face-like patterns as well (Nguyen et al., 2014). Additionally, nonhuman primates demonstrate 
specialized behavioral responses to faces, such as fast and efficient search and a proficiency in 
discriminating faces based on features such as identity, familiarity, expression, and more (Parr, 
2003; Parr et al., 2000; Pokorny & de Waal, 2009a; Talbot et al., 2016). Efficient search for 
faces and captured attention towards faces have also been demonstrated in chimpanzees 
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(Tomonaga & Imura, 2009, 2015). Nonhuman primates and other animals, like humans, also 
demonstrate strong preferences for viewing faces and facial features in the correct configuration 
(Dupierrix et al., 2014; Farroni et al., 2005; Goren et al., 1975; Gothard et al., 2004; Kuwahata et 
al., 2004; Myowa-Yamakoshi & Tomonaga, 2001; Rosa-Salva et al., 2010; Rosa Salva et al., 
2011; Sugita, 2008). Given their closely related biological and psychological systems, nonhuman 
primate species have long been studied to understand our hypersensitivity to faces and the 
evolutionary origins for our behavioral response towards faces.   
Despite the multitude of shared, specialized responses to faces, there also appear to be 
some highly relevant differences among primate species in other aspects of cognitive and 
perceptual abilities. For example, comparative work suggests that ape and monkey species differ 
in their precedence of global versus local stimulus properties during discrimination tasks. Like 
humans, chimpanzees discriminate hierarchical stimuli based on their global properties (Fujita & 
Matsuzawa, 1990; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Tomonaga & Matsuzawa, 1992; but see Fagot & 
Tomonaga, 1999, for a study in which chimpanzees did not show a global bias). Hopkins and 
Washburn (2002) used a sequential matching-to-sample task in which subjects had to match a 
hierarchically compound stimulus (like in Navon’s studies; e.g., a large ‘F’ made up of smaller 
‘E’s) to an identical sample while ignoring a foil stimulus that differed either at the global, local, 
or both levels. Chimpanzees performed better when the difference between the two stimuli was 
global in nature. 
Monkeys, unlike humans and other great apes, rely more on local features when 
discriminating hierarchical stimuli (De Lillo et al., 2005, 2012; Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; Fagot & 
Deruelle, 1997; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Neiworth et al., 2006; Spinozzi et al., 2003, 2006, 
2009). However, the local precedence observed in monkey species has varying degrees of 
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strength in its actual perceptual bias. For example, rhesus monkeys performed similarly when 
discriminating stimuli that differed on either local or global information in the study by Hopkins 
and Washburn (2002). Therefore, this “local bias” might be better described as a lack of global 
bias. Capuchin monkeys were biased towards local features in a matching-to-sample task, but 
this bias weakened when inter-element distance was decreased and the stimuli appeared denser 
(Spinozzi et al., 2003). Similarly, Neiworth et al. (2006) found that tamarins, after being trained 
to select a circle made up of smaller circles, were just as likely to select a global circle made up 
of local squares as a global square made up of local circles when inter-element distance was 
larger. However, when the interelement distance was reduced and the same stimuli appeared 
more densely arranged, monkeys showed a global bias. Baboons also initially showed a local 
bias towards the same stimuli in which humans showed a global bias (Fagot & Deruelle, 1997). 
However, when this was tested with reduced inter-element distance the local bias in baboons was 
also reduced (Fagot et al., 2001). Therefore, monkeys may rely equally on local features and 
global configurations when discriminating stimuli whereas apes rely more on the global 
configuration. This is similar to the literature on children’s ability to discriminate and reproduce 
hierarchical stimuli. For example, cotton top tamarins and capuchin monkeys discriminated these 
arrays similarly to how young children performed (De Lillo et al., 2005; Neiworth et al., 2006). 
Several studies have reported that monkeys, apes, and young children can perceive stimuli at 
both the local and global levels effectively (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; Dukette & Stiles, 1996; 
Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Fagot & Tomonaga, 1999; Feeney & Stiles, 1996; Hopkins & 
Washburn, 2002; Prather & Bacon, 1986; Stiles et al., 1991; Stiles & Tada, 1996; Tada & Stiles-
Davis, 1989). Therefore, it is important to understand whether monkeys and children perceive 
face pareidolia to similar degrees – doing so could reveal important species similarities related to 
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how stimulus characteristics are grouped and perceived. Alternatively, it could lend crucial 
insight into the role that human experience plays in perceiving faces from a young age. 
Building on studies of global and local processing, research has also investigated whether 
nonhuman animals are susceptible to the same misperceptions as humans (see Feng et al., 2017, 
and Wasserman, 2012, for reviews). For example, chimpanzees do not perceive the Solitaire 
illusion, but rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys sometimes do (Agrillo et al., 2014). This is 
surprising because we might expect that because chimpanzees, like humans, tend to process 
stimuli globally, they should also experience the Gestalt grouping principles that cause humans 
to perceive the “grouped” arrays as more numerous in the Solitaire illusion. However, rhesus and 
capuchin monkeys do not readily perceive the Delboeuf illusion (Parrish et al., 2015), but 
chimpanzees, like humans, do (Parrish & Beran, 2014). These results are consistent with a more 
predominantly global processing strategy in apes. Additionally, baboons failed to perceive the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Parron & Fagot, 2007). Overall, these results are consistent with 
what we would expect given the differences in monkeys’ and apes’ local and global processing 
strategies. Further, these studies demonstrate the visual illusions are sometimes, but not always, 
common across species of primates. 
1.1.4 Face perception in nonhuman primates 
Given what we know about how monkeys and nonhuman apes process nonface 
hierarchical stimuli, we might not expect to find evidence for the face inversion effect of the 
composite face illusion in monkey species. However, research suggests that monkeys often 
display a global precedence when it comes to faces, and that, they too, process faces holistically 
(Taubert et al., 2012a; for a review see Parr, 2011a). As mentioned earlier, faces are salient and 
important stimuli, and they are the foundation of many social interactions. Therefore, a need to 
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recognize and distinguish one face from another quickly likely causes many species of primates 
to process faces holistically even from infancy, despite some species’ tendencies to process other 
environmental stimuli locally (Kuwahata et al., 2004; Parr, 2011a; Parr et al., 2006; Paukner et 
al., 2014; Sugita, 2008). Evidence for holistic face processing has been shown in several studies 
investigating the face inversion effect in great apes and monkeys. Chimpanzees are better at 
discriminating faces when they are presented upright than when they are presented inverted 
(Parr, 2011a; Parr & Heintz, 2006; Parr et al., 1998; Tomonaga, 1999, 2007), indicating that 
they, like humans, are holistically processing faces. For example, one study found that as faces 
are rotated from an upright to an inverted position, chimpanzees’ impairments in discriminating 
conspecific faces increased linearly (Parr & Heintz, 2006).  
Face inversion effects have been found in cotton-topped tamarins, squirrel monkeys, 
capuchins, Japanese macaques, and Rhesus macaque monkeys (Dahl et al., 2009; Gothard et al., 
2009; Neiworth et al., 2007; Overman & Doty, 1982; Parr et al., 1999; Parr, 2011b; Parr et al., 
2000; Parr & Heintz, 2008; Phelps & Roberts, 1994; Pokorny & de Waal, 2009a, 2009b; 
Pokorny, Webb, & de Waal, 2011; Tomonaga, 1994; Vermeire & Hamilton, 1998; Wright & 
Roberts, 1996; see Parr, 2011a, for a review). On the other hand, several studies have failed to 
find conclusive evidence of an inversion effect (Bruce, 1982; Dittrich, 1990; Gothard et al., 
2004; Rosenfeld & Van Hoesen, 1979; Weiss et al., 2001). Unlike chimpanzees, rhesus monkeys 
sometimes appear susceptible to the effect across several stimulus categories, including 
conspecific faces, chimpanzee faces, capuchin faces, and even sometimes for non-animal stimuli 
such as houses or automobiles (Parr et al., 1999; Parr, 2011b; Parr & Heintz, 2008). These mixed 
results in the monkey face inversion literature demonstrates that while monkeys process faces 
holistically, this tendency may not be as strong as in human and most great ape studies. 
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Evidence for the Thatcher illusion also demonstrates the inconsistencies apparent in the 
inversion effect. Studies using viewing preference as a measure of the illusion reported that 
rhesus macaques do perceive the Thatcher illusion. For example, monkeys’ viewing patterns 
indicated that they perceived normal and Thatcherized conspecific faces as different when they 
were upright, but less so when they were inverted (Adachi et al., 2009; Dahl et al., 2011). Nakata 
and Osada (2012) reported evidence of a Thatcher effect in squirrel monkeys, but the monkeys in 
this experiment had to first undergo training to discriminate between normal and Thatcherized 
faces, whereas in previous experiments monkeys were not exposed to Thatcherized faces before 
testing. In a matching task, baboons were unable to discriminate between inverted Thatcherized 
and non-Thatcherized face (Parron & Fagot, 2008). In a matching-to-sample task paradigm, 
chimpanzees, but not rhesus monkeys, perceived the Thatcher illusion, indicating a more distinct 
difference between monkeys’ and apes’ dependence on configural facial information (Weldon et 
al., 2013). 
Inconsistencies in the composite face effect have also been reported in great apes and 
monkeys (Taubert, 2010; Taubert & Parr, 2009). Evidence for this effect has been shown in 
chimpanzees viewing conspecific face images (Taubert et al., 2012b; Parr et al., 2006).  In an 
eye-tracking study, rhesus monkeys showed the composite face effect for chimpanzees and 
conspecific faces (Dahl et al., 2007). However, Taubert and Parr (2009) reported that rhesus 
monkeys experienced the composite face effect for chimpanzee but not human faces. Overall, 
research on the composite face effect indicates that monkeys and apes are processing faces 
holistically, but perhaps to varying degrees. 
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1.1.5 A comparative approach to studying face pareidolia 
Several of the difficulties with comparative research, especially pertaining to studying 
face processing, include the variability in which nonhuman subjects are raised and kept and the 
level of experience the animals have with human experimenters (including whether they see their 
faces due to differences in personal protective equipment across facilities). Also, comparative 
research employs a wide spectrum of methodologies and types of stimuli to measure an animal’s 
perceptual experience. There is no benefit of verbal instruction or feedback, so researchers must 
be especially stringent on task design to ensure that behavioral tasks are, in fact, measuring the 
intended phenomenon. Still, different types of tasks are often used to measure the same behavior 
or phenomenon. In the studies summarized above, many only tested one or two species, used 
tasks ranging from passive eye viewing to active matching paradigms, and the stimuli varied in 
color, size, angle, or including of various features. Several did not use control stimuli to compare 
effects of faces against nonface stimuli. Overall, the inconsistencies apparent in comparative 
findings, especially with research focusing on inversion or composite face effects, could reflect 
the inconsistencies in methodology. The wide variety of tasks, stimuli, and generally small 
number of individuals and species included can make it difficult to integrate results into a clear 
and cohesive conclusion as to one species’ overarching perceptual experience, much less a 
broader claim about primates in general. Because of this, the present study uses two species of 
nonhuman primates, including both Old World and New World monkeys. The methodology is 
based upon previous tasks used to measure this phenomenon in hopes of clarifying and/or 
building on already existing yet seemingly conflicting results.  
Currently, there are very few studies of how primates process faces when their local 
features are not features of a face but contain a facial configuration, such as face pareidolia. 
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There is some work in which facial information has been degraded, such as when chimpanzees 
were presented with Mooney faces (in which second-order relational information is limited and 
discrimination is based on first order properties; Taubert & Parr, 2012). Despite the shared neural 
and behavioral responses to faces across numerous species of nonhuman primates outlined 
above, pareidolia has not been well-studied in the comparative literature. A recent eye-tracking 
study showed a viewing preference for illusory faces over nonface objects as well as higher 
fixation frequency for illusory “eye” and “mouth” regions (Taubert et al., 2017), consistent with 
typical primate gaze behavior when viewing a real face (Dal Monte et al., 2014; Guastella et al., 
2008; Leonard et al., 2012). This work suggests that monkeys do indeed perceive a face-like 
configuration in illusory faces. However, an experiment investigating face pareidolia in capuchin 
monkeys, rhesus monkeys, and children (3 to 5 years old) found that only children, and not 
monkeys, categorized Arcimboldo images as faces more often than they categorized scattered 
Arcimboldo images as faces (Beran et al., 2017). This result instead suggests that monkeys do 
not readily recognize illusory faces, or rather, categorize them as such. However, the apparent 
inconsistency across these two studies may reflect a difference in the dependent measures 
generated by differing methodologies, as well as what stage in perceptual processing is being 
measured. As outlined above, looking-time experiments clearly indicate that primates are 
sensitive and prefer to look at faces and face-like patterns. It is likely that these studies are 
measuring an implicit behavior rooted in early perceptual processing. For example, when we 
walk through a busy hall or take part in a conversation, we are not necessarily aware that we 
primarily fixate on people’s faces. If this is true for nonhuman primates as well, a preference for 
looking at an illusory face may not necessarily indicate an explicit recognition of a face-like 
pattern, but an implicit attraction to that configuration. Holistic processing is described as a 
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relatively automatic process (Richler et al, 2009; Tanaka & Farah, 1993), so it is possible that the 
sensitivity towards configural information happens before the explicit recognition of a face is 
possible.  
A task in which subjects are required to make an active response as to whether a stimulus 
is a face requires more active decision, rooted in later perceptual processing that takes into 
account previous experiences (such as those that have taught us what is a face and what is not). 
For example, we may see a “natural” example of face pareidolia (a face in the clouds) or view an 
Arcimboldo portrait, but we employ our knowledge of the world in order to recognize that, 
despite its face-like appearance, it is not a true face. In other words, we make an explicit and 
conscious decision as to the contents of the image. If this is also true for monkeys, they may 
recognize the face-like pattern of Arcimboldo images (a behavior that could be identified using 
eye-tracking measures) but make an explicit decision about whether it is truly a ‘face’ or a ‘food’ 
based on later cognitive processing (a behavior measured by a categorization task). The local 
features are made up of foods, and therefore it could be categorized as ‘food.’ However, the 
global configuration appears face-like and could be categorized as ‘face.’ Both categories are 
simultaneously represented within each Arcimboldo image. So, if a monkey is explicitly 
recognizing both properties, it may be difficult to identify these images consistently as one or the 
other. The salience of the local elements (various types of foods) in Arcimboldo images could 
also play a role in this decision-making process. In fact, Beran and colleagues (2017) found that 
the monkeys performed at chance levels on this particular discrimination.   
Studying face pareidolia in nonhuman primates will elucidate how face processing is 
involved in early (implicit/passive viewing behavior) and late (explicit/active choice) perceptual 
processes. It will further our understanding as to what facial characteristics (featural vs 
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configural) are necessary or prioritized in recognizing and/or categorizing stimuli as a face or as 
face-like, and, it will increase our knowledge of how different species employ different 
perceptual processing strategies for a stimulus that lies somewhere between an object and a face. 
This study will lend insight into how experience (whether it be with faces in general or 
experience with illusory faces) plays a role in the perception of face pareidolia. Overall, studying 
face pareidolia in multiple species using consistent methods will clarify true differences or 
similarities in visual perception across primates. For instance, a difference in how monkeys and 
children perceive illusory faces (i.e., children perform better at identifying the face-like nature of 
illusory faces) would indicate that, despite their similarities in processing some stimuli, there are 
species differences in what stimulus characteristics elicits the recognition and judgment of a 
face-like pattern. If there is no difference in how monkeys and children recognize illusory faces, 
and they both respond to such stimuli similarly to real faces, this would suggest that the 
characteristics that trigger the judgement of an image as “face-like” are shared across multiple 
primate species, and that this illusion in not unique to just humans. 
2 METHODS 
2.1 Participants 
A total of 21 brown-tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella: 14 females and 7 males; 7 
to 40 years old) were tested on a computerized task. All capuchin monkeys were group-housed 
(ranging from 2 to 9 individuals per group) with daily indoor and outdoor access at Georgia State 
University’s Language Research Center where they had continuous access to water and were fed 
a diet of primate chow, fruits, nuts, and vegetables by trained animal care staff. During testing, 
monkeys voluntarily separated into individual testing spaces. Additionally, 7 rhesus macaque 
monkeys (Macca mulatta: all males between 16 and 36 years old) were tested. All rhesus 
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macaque monkeys were housed individually with continuous visual and auditory access to 
nearby conspecifics. Compatible partners were given access to each other multiple times per 
week in an indoor-outdoor enclosure. Rhesus monkeys had continuous access to water and were 
fed a diet of primate chow, fruits, nuts, and vegetables by trained animal care staff. Because of 
the likelihood of failing to engage with or pass through all phases of the task, all monkeys that 
were available at the time of data collection were tested. Additionally, due to unforeseen 
circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, data collection concluded earlier and, thus, 
limited the possible sample size. Overall, 14 of the 21 capuchins that were tested successfully 
completed all phases of the experiment. Three capuchins completed the pre-test but failed to pass 
the training and generalization phases (described below) and four capuchins failed to complete 
the pre-test phase. Therefore, only the 14 capuchins that completed the experiment were included 
in the analyses. All seven rhesus macaques completed all phases of the experiment. 
 A total of 46 preschool-aged children (26 female) were tested on the pre-test 
phase, to ensure no prior preference for choosing faces existed. After pre-test data collection, a 
total of 60 children (including those tested on the pre-test) participated in the training and test 
phases of the experiment. Children ranged in age from 37 to 61 months and were tested at local 
preschools in the Atlanta, Georgia area. According to the literature summarized above, this age 
range included children for whom global processing typically was not yet the dominant form of 
perceptual processing, but holistic face processing was commonly reported. Therefore, this age 
group was an ideal study sample to investigate whether children will employ global processing 
strategies on a face-like object.  Prior to testing, parents read and signed consent forms allowing 
their children to participate in the study. On the day of testing, children provided verbal assent 
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and agreed to work with the experimenters. At any time during testing, if children indicated that 
they wanted to stop working, the experimenters escorted the children back to their classrooms. 
2.2 Materials 
Testing for the capuchin and rhesus monkeys was conducted using the Language 
Research Center’s Computerized Test System (LRC-CTS; Evans et al., 2008; Richardson et al., 
1990). The LRC-CTS includes a testing computer, joystick, color monitor, and pellet reward 
system per individual. Individual testing spaces were equipped to connect to the LRC-CTS to 
allow subjects continuous access to the testing system while in those spaces. Monkeys 
manipulated the joystick to produce movements of a cursor displayed on the monitor. For a 
‘correct’ response, monkeys received a food reward in the form of a banana flavored pellet as 
well as a positive melodic tone. For an ‘incorrect’ response, there was no food reward, a negative 
buzz tone, and a timeout of 20 seconds before the next trial began.  
 Experimenters brought children from their classroom to a testing room where they 
worked on touchscreen laptop computers. If children were tested in pairs, they were seated on 
opposite sides of a table from each other to prevent either child from seeing their partner’s screen 
and/or choices. Children started each trial and made responses by tapping their finger on the 
image that they selected. Children received audio feedback that corresponded to their response (a 
buzz if incorrect and a ‘woo-hoo!’ if correct).  
Stimuli consisted of five categories: real faces (F; composed of all three species being 
tested), pareidolia images/exemplars (P), nonfaces (N; composed of inanimate objects and 
animate plants and animals that do not contain a face; hereafter referred to as ‘objects’), scattered 
real faces (S) and scattered pareidolia faces (X; see Figure 2 for an example of all stimulus 
categories). The real face stimuli were from the Labeled Faces in the Wild online free database 
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(Huang et al., 2007). Rhesus and capuchin face stimuli were gathered from various collaborators’ 
libraries (Rhesus: Dr. Jessica Taubert; Capuchin: Dr. Kate Talbot & Dr. Sarah Brosnan). Illusory 
face images were collected from the public domain using the Google image search engine. 
Object images were gathered from the public domain using the Google image search engine as 
well as various online databases. Only images under creative commons license and/or labeled for 
noncommercial reuse with modification were used as stimuli. The pareidolia face images 
contained a variety of background content, so using the Labeled Faces in the Wild and other 
online sources to acquire object images ensured that background information was variable for all 
image categories. The scattered images were created from the F and P stimuli, using a Visual 
Basic 6.0 program that divided each image into a 16 
X 16 grid and randomized the location of each square 
in the grid. Only scattered images that did not contain 
any face-like configuration (no two consecutive 
squares were aligned horizontally or vertically) were 
used as S or X stimuli. All stimuli were cropped and 
resized to square dimensions. Additionally, images 
were cropped in a manner so that they fully 
contained the face, face-like configuration, or object. 
Figure 2 presents examples of all these image types. 
All three species viewed face stimuli of capuchin 
monkeys, rhesus monkeys, and humans. In doing so, 
all three species encountered the same exact trials 
and images throughout their respective testing phases. Further, using multiple species’ faces as 
Figure 2. All stimulus categories for the 
computerized task. a. real face (F). b. 
scattered real face (S). c. pareidolia (P). 








‘face’ exemplars ensured that a general ‘face’ concept was being used during the rule learning in 
the training phase, rather than any specific features unique to a certain species’ face. Object 
images contained inanimate objects and animate objects such as plants and animal images in 
which the face was cropped out or turned away. By including animate objects, this prevented 
subjects from learning to select an image that was ‘animate’ rather than learning a face-selective 
rule.  
2.3 Design and Procedure 
2.3.1 Pretests 
The 28 monkeys (21 capuchins, 7 rhesus) were tested on a forced-choice simultaneous 
matching-to-sample task. Monkeys used a joystick to move a cursor until it came into contact 
with the sample image, presented at the center of the screen. Then two choices – the target 
(identical to the sample) and a distractor (of any stimulus category described above) were 
presented until the monkey moved the cursor to select one of the images. Correct choices 
(selecting the target) resulted in positive reinforcement in the form of a positive tone and a single 
45mg food pellet reward. All stimulus categories were included in this test and target and 
distractor images were presented randomly in two or four randomly selected positions on the 
screen. Because all stimulus categories were included, this pre-test served to give the monkeys a 
positive reinforcement history with each type of stimulus category and avoid biasing their 
behavior in the training and test phases. For instance, this pre-test was implemented to prevent 
subjects from avoiding certain stimulus classes that were present in the test phase but not the 
training and generalization phase and to deter them from using a strategy based on the 
reinforcement history of the training and generalization phases. The task was made up of blocks 
of 600 trials. A total of 120 stimuli (30 F, 30 N, 30 S, 30 scattered N) were presented and 
25 
repeated throughout these 600 trials. Scattered objects were used in place of scattered pareidolia 
(X) images to acclimate monkeys to the scattered image appearance but to prevent using the 
same stimuli in the test phase. Criterion for the completion of the pre-test was a 75% correct on a 
block of 600 trials, or the completion of five blocks. 
The children also completed a pre-test. Thirty pairs of images, each made up of an F and 
N image were presented on laminated sheets in front of each child. These images were the same 
images that were later included in the training phase of the computer program. The experimenter 
instructed the child to point to and/or touch one picture in each pair that they preferred or 
considered their ‘favorite.’ Choices were coded on a separate sheet of paper by the experimenter. 
At the conclusion of this test, children were asked to state why they chose some of the images as 
their favorite and/or why they preferred certain images over the others. This pre-test determined 
whether children had a pre-existing bias for selecting face images over nonface images before 
the training phase. Given the evidence provided by the literature summarized above, if faces are 
already inherently special to children in a way that causes them to choose these images 
preferentially, children should already show this pattern even before any training for this rule is 
done. 
2.3.2 Training Phase 
All monkeys completed a training and a generalization phase before the test phase of the 
experiment. In the training phase, monkeys initiated trials by moving the cursor on the screen 
towards a ‘Start’ button displayed on the monitor at screen center. Contacting this button resulted 
in the presentation of two stimuli simultaneously displayed at two of four randomly selected 
positions on the screen, to eliminate any potential biases for selecting images in certain spatial 
locations. Each trial presented one F and one N image, and subjects were required to select one 
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of these images using a joystick to move the on-screen cursor. Choosing the image that contained 
a real face (F) resulted in positive auditory feedback and a food reward. After a 1 second inter-
trial interval (ITI), the ‘Start’ button indicating the next trial appeared. Choosing the N image 
resulted in negative auditory feedback and a 20-second time-out. In the training phase, subjects 
were required to meet a criterion of 80%, or 32 out of the most recent 40 trials completed. After 
the initial 40 trials, stimuli were repeated. Once this criterion was met, the program automatically 
progressed the monkey to the generalization phase.  
The generalization phase also consisted of 40 trials of F and N stimuli. However, subjects 
were required to meet criterion of 32/40 correct within these 40 trials. Further, stimuli were 
novel faces and objects and were not repeated. The purpose of this training phase was to ensure 
that monkeys could generalize the rule (faces are correct) to new stimuli. Meeting this criterion 
resulted in the program automatically moving the monkey to the test phase. Failure to reach 
32/40 correct resulted in the monkey being placed back into the training phase, viewing the same 
stimuli as before. Each monkey was given up to five attempts at unique versions of the 
generalization phase. If they failed to reach criterion after five attempts, they were removed from 
the study. The 80% training criterion was created to ensure that monkeys were performing at 
levels of chance or both the training and generalization phase, since we could not give them the 
rule like we could with children. Further, this criterion level was chosen because it allowed 
monkeys to maintain interest in the task. For example, if criterion was too strict, animals may 
have begun to lose motivation to engage with the task because it was more difficult to obtain the 
food reward.  
Testing with the children took place in approximately 15-minute sessions. Because of 
this, only a brief training phase was completed before the test phase. The training and test phase 
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were completed within a single session. Each child participated in a minimum of two sessions 
and a maximum of three. The training phase consisted of a maximum of 40 trials. The child 
tapped a “Start” button displayed on the laptop screen, then two stimuli appeared at two of four 
random positions on the screen, to eliminate any potential biases for selecting images in certain 
spatial locations. Each trial in the training phase presented one F and one N image and the child 
would make a selection by tapping an image on the screen with their finger. Selecting an F image 
was followed by a 1 second ITI and positive auditory feedback. Selecting an N image was 
followed by a 3 second time-out and negative auditory feedback. In order to pass the training 
phase, children were required to respond correctly to 9 out of the 10 most recent trials completed. 
Therefore, some children could move on to the test phase in as few as 10 trials. However, if the 
child failed to meet this criterion within 40 trials, their session was ended. If the child passed the 
training phase they were prompted with a brief question (“Can you tell me what the rule was for 
choosing the correct picture?”). The experimenter manually entered the child’s response and then 
had the child continue to the test phase.  
For the children who failed to meet criterion on their first session, they were given an 
opportunity to repeat that session on a later date where the experimenter told them the rule “Pick 
the image that looks most like a face.” Regardless of whether children passed or failed training 
(and ultimately repeated) their first session, all children were told the rule by the experimenter 
when they participated in the second session. This allowed me to examine whether children were 
able to comprehend and state the rule on their own without the experimenter’s prompt. Because 
all children completed a second session having had the rule explicitly stated to them, it was 
possible to determine whether knowing having the rule impacted performance. Overall, the 
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children who failed training and repeated the first session before completing the second session 
were tested on three separate days. 
2.3.3 Test Phase 
The test phase continued to present F vs. N trials, but now pareidolia (P), scattered real 
faces (S), and scattered pareidolia (X) were also presented. Scattered pareidolia images were 
used instead of scattered N images because, like scattered N images, they lacked both face 
features and face configuration, but controlled for image content that was presented in pareidolia 
images. For the monkeys, the test phase consisted of 90% baseline trials, which were the same 
format as the trials from the training phases but presented novel images that were unique from 
those in the training and generalization phases. The remaining 10% of the trials were composed 
of five different types of probe trials (F vs. S, F vs. P, P vs. N, P vs. S, and P vs. X; see below for 
hypotheses and why these specific trial types have been selected). Monkeys completed a total of 
2,000 trials in the test phase, collected over multiple sessions. Overall, 1,800 trials were baseline 
(F vs. N) and 40 trials of each probe trial type were collected. Because of the time limitations for 
children, test phases consisted of 50% baseline trials and 50% probe trials. Each session 
presented 100 trials in the test phase, 50 of which were baseline (F vs. N) and 10 each were of 
the probe trials. Across the sessions, children completed two test phases, totaling 200 trials. 
Trial order was randomized, and all stimuli were unique from the training phases. 
Baseline trials continued to be reinforced with a 1 second ITI and positive auditory feedback. 
However, probe trials were non-differentially reinforced (resulting in positive feedback 50% of 
the time and no feedback 50% of the time), to prevent any learning effects or biases for selecting 
specific stimuli types. 
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2.4 Hypotheses 
I predicted that children and both species of monkeys would select images that contained 
a face-like configuration over an image that contained no face-like configuration after being 
trained on a task in which the selection of a face was positively reinforced. Overall, I predicted to 
find no significant species differences any of the trial types and comparisons outlined below.  
When two images that did not contain a real face were presented, subjects should have 
selected the one that appears more like a face, indicating perception of that image as “face-like.” 
More specifically, I predicted that in trials that contain a face (F), subjects should have selected 
the F image above chance levels (see Table 1a). This would confirm that all subjects learned the 
rule that the image that contains a face was correct. Then, in trials that presented a pareidolia 
face with a nonface or a scattered pareidolia image (i.e., image categories that did not contain 
facial features or facial configurations), they should select the pareidolia image more often than 
chance. This finding would confirm that, in the absence of a real face, an image with a face-like 
configuration was perceived as more like a face than a nonface/scattered pareidolia face. For 
trials that paired scattered real faces with pareidolia images, I predicted that subjects would 
select pareidolia faces significantly above chance levels. This finding would confirm that 
subjects perceived and relied on the accurate facial configuration of a pareidolia image as more 
face-like than an image that contained the correct facial features but lacked the correct facial 
configuration. 
For the planned comparisons proposed in this project, I predicted that the proportion of 
choices for pareidolia faces in pareidolia versus nonface trials would not differ from the 
proportion choice for real faces in face versus nonface trials (see Table 2). This finding would 
provide evidence for a pareidolia effect, such that pareidolia faces were being selected at rates 
30 
similar to real faces. However, this would only provide strong evidence for a pareidolia effect 
given that faces were chosen more than scattered faces in F vs. S and that pareidolia images were 
chosen more than scattered pareidolia in P vs. X. However, if subjects performed at chance level 
on either of these trial types, it cannot be ruled out that the participants were using a ‘nonface 
avoidance’ strategy rather than a ‘face selective’ strategy. If monkeys or children relied on a 
nonface avoidance strategy to progress to the test phase, they should have performed at chance 
level on trials that only presented images containing face parts (F vs. S) and trials that only 
presented images containing object parts (P vs. X). For the next comparison, I predicted that the 
proportion of choices for real faces in F vs. S trials would not differ from the proportion of 
choices for pareidolia faces in P vs. S trials. Again, this would provide evidence for a pareidolia 
effect because faces and pareidolia images would be treated similarly when paired with scattered 
face stimuli. I also predicted that the proportion of choices for pareidolia faces in P vs. S trials 
would be significantly greater than the proportion choice for pareidolia images in P vs. F trials. If 
this hypothesis is supported, it would indicate that subjects perceived pareidolia faces as being 
more face like when paired with a scattered face rather than when paired with a real face. For the 
final comparison, I predicted that the proportion of choices for faces in F vs. P trials would be 
significantly lower than the proportion of choices for faces in F vs N trials. This finding would 
suggest that when real faces were paired with an image that also elicited a face-like reaction, 





Table 1. Trial types of interest with respective hypothesized directionality of the 
proportion choices. 
Trial Type Hypothesis 
F vs. N F > N 
F vs. P F > P 
F vs. S F > S 
P vs. N P > N 
P vs. S P > S 
P vs. X P > X 
 
 
Table 2. Planned comparisons of specific trial types and respective hypothesized 
directionality. Proportions used in all trial types above are reflected by the first letter of the trial 
type. 
Comparison Hypothesis 
P vs. N & F vs. N P vs. N = F vs. N 
F vs. S & P vs. S F vs. S = P vs. S 
P vs. S & P vs. F P vs. S > P vs. F 
F vs. P & F vs. N F vs. P < F vs. N 
 
3 Results 
3.1 Pretest and Training – Children  
Overall, there was no initial preference for selecting faces over nonfaces. Instead, 
children chose nonface images significantly more often than chance level (one sample t(45) = -
4.83, p < 0.001). An independent samples t-test showed no significant effect of sex (t(44) = 0.91, 
p = 0.37). There was also no relationship between age and the proportion of choices of face 
stimuli (r(46) = -0.12, p = 0.44). Children reported most often selecting the pictures they ‘liked’ 
(for example: “Because I like monkeys.” or “Because I like the beach.”). On an individual level, 
23 out of 46 children (50%) significantly differed from chance on their selection. Of those, 19 
chose nonface images significantly more than chance whereas five children chose faces 
significantly more than chance (p < 0.05, binomial test). Thus, there was no a priori bias to select 
face stimuli. 
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In total, 40 children completed the first session without the rule being given to them. 
Twelve children then completed a re-attempt at the first session with the rule. Then, 46 children 
completed second sessions in which they were given the rule. A total of 18 sessions, including 
both first and second sessions, were excluded from analysis because the child failed to pass the 
training phase. Three additional sessions were excluded from analysis because the child failed to 
complete all the test trials in the session. There were five test sessions that were excluded from 
analysis due to experimenter error: failure to give the child the rule in the second session or 
repeating a test session that had already been completed.  Thus, the following analyses were 
based on a total of 98 sessions. 
To compare the number of trials it took for children to reach the test phase as a function 
of whether they were told the rule, I compiled data from children who completed two sessions, 
one with the explicit rule, and one without the rule being stated explicitly (N = 36). Because the 
data were non-normally distributed (No Rule Sessions: W(36) = 0.83, p < 0.001; Session with 
Rule: W(36) = 0.38, p < 0.001), I used Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests to assess whether the number 
of trials to criterion differed between these groups.  It took significantly fewer trials for children 
to reach criterion when the rule was given (M = 11.81, SD = 5.53) than when the rule was not 
given (M = 19.00, SD = 9.84; T = 325.00, z = -3.80, p < 0.001).  Although this effect likely 
reflects a causal relation of rule condition on performance, one must also recognize the rule was 
always given at some point after a non-rule session, and so this might also reflect an experience 
effect. 
3.2 Pretest and Training – Monkeys  
A total of 21 capuchin monkeys (14 female) were tested on the simultaneous matching-
to-sample pre-test. However, due to low interest in participating in the task, 2 males and 1 female 
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failed to complete five sessions before the conclusion of data collection. The remaining 18 
capuchins completed the pre-test, although three of these monkeys (Lychee, Bailey, and Irene) 
never reached the 75% correct criterion but did complete five 600-trial blocks. 
Of the 18 capuchin monkeys that moved on to the training phase, three females (Nala, 
Ivory, and Applesauce) ultimately passed the training phase but failed all five generalization 
phases, and one male (Liam) failed to pass training or complete any generalization phase before 
data collection ended. Therefore, a total of 14 capuchin monkeys (4 males; 10 females) passed 
training, generalization, and completed the test phase (see Table 3). 
A total of 7 rhesus monkeys were tested and passed the simultaneous matching-to-sample 
pre-test, reaching the 75% correct criterion in one or two 600-trial blocks. All seven rhesus 
14 M 148 1 0.83 0.88 0.39 0.76 0.90
21 F 1203 failed all 5 - - - - -
18 F 1119 4 0.83 0.78 0.31 0.78 0.83
8 F 961 3 0.90 0.65 7.17 0.014* 0.78
7 F 241 3 0.80 0.78 0.08 1.00 0.85
9 F 566 3 0.85 0.83 0.09 1.00 0.82
22 M 1595 2 0.80 0.58 4.71 0.05 0.68
22 F 809 3 0.80 0.83 0.08 1.00 0.87
17 F 1053 3 0.85 0.68 3.38 0.11 0.75
12 M 121 1 0.88 0.88 < 0.001 1.00 0.93
17 F 487 failed all 5 - - - - -
20 F 362 2 0.85 0.80 0.35 0.77 0.86
23 F 905 4 0.83 0.80 0.08 1.00 0.82
16 F 354 3 0.90 0.80 1.57 0.35 0.89
20 F 340 1 0.70 0.83 0.39 0.76 0.81
15 F 1081 failed all 5 - - - - -
8 M 588 2 0.90 0.70 5.00 0.048* 0.92
17 M 1034 1 0.80 0.83 0.08 1.00 0.89
16 M 133 1 0.95 0.88 1.41 0.43 0.91
37 M 1651 5 0.83 0.78 0.31 0.78 0.74
21 M 303 1 0.80 0.55 5.70 0.031* 0.89
20 M 527 4 0.88 0.85 0.11 1.00 0.83
27 M 356 2 0.80 0.73 0.62 0.60 0.87













































on F vs. N in 
Test Phase
Chi-square 
Table 3. Summary of monkey information, performance, and progression through 
training and generalization phases. "*" denotes significant difference in performance between 
the 40 trials of the successful generalization phase and the first 40 trials of test phase. 
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monkeys progressed to the training phase and passed their respective generalization phases and 
completed all test trials (See Table 3).  
Before examining the test data, I compared the 40 trials in each monkey’s successfully 
completed generalization phase to the first 40 F vs. N trials of their respective test phases to 
assess whether monkey’s maintained similar levels of performance in selecting the face image. 
This would be conclusive evidence that they were using a rule to select stimuli that was not tied 
to specific stimuli. Because the rhesus data were non-normally distributed, I used a Wilcoxon 
signed rank test to compare the proportion of choices of  face stimuli in the generalization phase 
to the proportions for choosing face in the first 40 F vs. N trials (baseline trials) of the test phase. 
Overall, rhesus monkeys selected faces at the same level in the generalization phase (M = 0.84, 
SD = 0.06) and in the first 40 F vs. N trials in the test phase (M = 0.78, SD = 0.11; T = 4.00, z = -
1.71, p = 0.09). The capuchin data were normally distributed, so I examined these data with a 
paired-samples t-test. Capuchin monkeys selected faces more often in the generalization phase 
(M = .84, SD = .05) than in the first 40 F vs. N trials in the test phase (M = 0.77, SD = 0.09; t(13) 
= 2.31, p = 0.038). However, upon closer examination into individual performance, this effect 
seems to be driven largely by a small number of individuals. For example, only 2 of the 14 
capuchins showed a significant difference between test phase and generalization phase (Albert: 
2(1) = 5.00, p = 0.048; Ira: 2(1) = 7.17, p = 0.014). Overall, the majority of the monkeys 
maintained performance immediately upon entering the test phase, indicating that they 
successfully generalized their strategy to the new test stimuli. It is also important to note that 
only 3 of the 14 capuchin monkeys did not maintain 80% throughout the 1,800 baseline trials in 
the test phase. Of those three, all were between 68-78% correct in choosing faces in those trials. 
Further, only one rhesus monkey was below 80% overall on the F vs. N baseline trials in the test 
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phase. Therefore, most of the monkeys maintained or exceeded 80% correct on the baseline trials 
throughout the test phase, indicating that they successfully maintained the use of their respective 
strategies throughout the task. See Table 3 for a summary of individual performances from 
generalization and the first portion of the test phase. 
3.3 Test – Overall Species Differences  
To test for a difference in performance across 
species, I calculated the proportion of choices of the 
most ‘face-like’ stimulus in each trial type for each 
individual in each species group (children N = 40; 
capuchin N = 14; macaque N =7). More specifically, 
I calculated the proportion of choosing the F stimulus 
in F vs. N, F vs. P, and F vs. S trials and the 
proportion of choosing the P stimulus in P vs. N, P 
vs. S, and P vs. X trials. For the sample of children, I 
used the first sessions that children completed 
without having the rule given to them. By doing this, 
the children’s test sessions in this analysis were the closest comparison to the test sessions 
presented to the monkeys. Because of the small sample sizes in each group, and non-normal data 
distributions (see Table 4), I used nonparametric tests to assess whether there was an overall 
species difference in performance across each trial type. I ran a Kruskal-Wallis independent 
samples test with the proportions for each trial type as my dependent variables and species as the 
independent variable. There were no overall species differences for the F vs. N and F vs. P trial 
types (H(2) = 5.04,  p = 0.08 and H(2) = 0.409, p = 0.82, respectively). However, there was a 
W df p
Children 0.79 40 < 0.001*
Capuchin 0.96 14 0.64
Rhesus 0.79 7 0.035*
Children 0.86 40 < 0.001
Capuchin 0.87 14 0.039*
Rhesus 0.90 7 0.31
Children 0.83 40 < 0.001*
Capuchin 0.88 14 0.06
Rhesus 0.93 7 0.51
Children 0.93 40 0.017*
Capuchin 0.93 14 0.34
Rhesus 0.91 7 0.40
Children 0.91 40 0.004*
Capuchin 0.98 14 0.95
Rhesus 0.98 7 0.93
Children 0.91 40 0.003*
Capuchin 0.91 14 0.17










Table 4. Summary of data 
distribution for each species and each 
trial type. In general, the children data 
are non-normally distributed for each 
trial type, whereas rhesus and capuchin 
monkeys have non-normally distributed 
data for one trial type each. 
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significant species difference for F vs. S (H(2) = 11.74, p = 0.003), P vs. N (H(2) =17.54, p < 
0.001), P vs. S (H(2) = 13.45, p = 0.001), and P vs. X (H(2) = 15.79, p < 0.001) trial types. To 
understand the nature of the species differences, I then conducted three Mann-Whitney tests to 
compare the pairwise performances of the capuchin monkeys, rhesus monkeys, and children, and 
I applied the Bonferroni correction to alpha to account for the effect of repeated testing of these 
data (p = .0166). First, the children and the capuchin monkeys differed significantly on the same 
four trial types that revealed the species differences. Children selected faces (M = 0.83, SD = 
0.19) significantly more than capuchin monkeys (M = 0.70, SD = 0.14) in the F vs. S trials (U = 
134.00, z = -2.92, p = 0.003). Similarly, children selected pareidolia images significantly more 
often than capuchin monkeys in P vs. N trials (Children: M = 0.72, SD = 0.21; Capuchin: M = 
0.50, SD = 0.07; U = 106.00, z = -3.46, p = 0.001), P vs. S trials (Children: M = 0.60, SD = 0.31; 
Capuchin: M = 0.30, SD = 0.08; U = 122.50, z = -3.12, p = 0.002), and P vs. X trials (Children: 
M = 0.74, SD = 0.21; Capuchin: M = 0.54, SD = 0.13; U = 112.00, z = -3.34, p = 0.001). There 
was no statistical difference between capuchin monkeys and children on the F vs. N trials 
(Children: M = 0.87, SD = 0.15; Capuchin: M = 0.84, SD = 0.07; U = 176.50, z = -2.05, p = 0.04) 
or F vs. P trials (Children: M = 0.73, SD = 0.28; Capuchin: M = 0.82, SD = 0.09; U = 273.50, z = 
-0.13, p = 0.90) trial types. When comparing the performance of children and rhesus monkeys, 
three trial types differed significantly after Bonferroni correction: P vs. N, P vs. S, and P vs. X. 
Specifically, children selected pareidolia images significantly more often when compared to 
nonface images (Children: M = 0.72, SD = 0.21; Rhesus: M = 0.49, SD = 0.06; U = 41.50, z = -
2.97, p = 0.002), when compared to scattered faces (Children: M = 0.60, SD = 0.31; Rhesus: M = 
0.28, SD = 0.08; U = 57.50, z = -2.48, p = 0.011), and when compared to scattered pareidolia 
images (Children: M = 0.74, SD = 0.21; Rhesus: M = 0.51, SD = 0.16; U= 49.00, z = -2.75, p = 
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0.005). Children also selected faces more than rhesus monkeys in F vs. S trials (Children: M = 
0.83, SD = 0.19; Rhesus: M = 0.69, SD = 0.12; U= 62.50, z = -2.37, p = 0.02), but this was not 
significant following Bonferroni correction. There was no significant difference between the 
proportions of choosing faces in either the F vs. N trials (Children: M = 0.87, SD = 0.15; Rhesus: 
M = 0.86, SD = 0.06; U = 100.50, z = -1.19, p = 0.24) or the F vs P trials (Children: M = 0.73, SD 
= 0.28; Rhesus: M = 0.85, SD = 0.13; U = 123.00, z = -0.52, p = 0.63) between children and 
rhesus monkeys. It is important to note that even though there were no significant differences 
between children and either of the monkey species in the F vs. P trial types, that monkeys 
selected faces more often than children, on average (Table 5). This also demonstrates that 
monkeys were successful at maintaining the rule of selecting faces and provides evidence that 
pareidolia images did not interfere with this to the extent they interfered with children’s 
performance. 
Finally, there was no statistical difference on any of the trial types between the two 
monkey species: F vs. N trials (Capuchin: M = 0.84, SD = 0.07; Rhesus: M = 0.86, SD = 0.06; U 
= 36.50, z = -0.94, p = 0.35), F vs. P trials (Capuchin: M = 0.82, SD = 0.09; Rhesus: M = 0.85, 
SD = 0.13; U = 38.00, z = -0.83, p = 0.41), F vs. S trials (Capuchin: M = 0.70, SD = 0.14; 
Rhesus: M = 0.69, SD = 0.12; U = 49.00, z = 0.00, p = 1.00), P vs. N trials (Capuchin: M = 0.50, 
SD = 0.07; Rhesus: M = 0.49, SD = 0.06; U = 39.50, z = -0.72, p = 0.47), P vs. S trials 
(Capuchin: M = 0.30, SD = 0.08; Rhesus: M = 0.28, SD = 0.08; U = 40.00, z = -0.68, p = 0.50), 
and P vs. X trials (Capuchin: M = 0.54, SD = 0.13; Rhesus: M = 0.51, SD = 0.16; U = 38.50, z = -
0.79, p = 0.43). Because there were no differences between the two monkey species, these data 
were collapsed across those species for all subsequent analyses. 
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Table 5 shows that children selected pareidolia images more than monkeys in every trial 
type they were presented. It is also interesting to note that both species of monkeys were more 
affected when a scrambled face was paired with a face image, indicating that the local features of 
faces interfered with the baseline performance seen in F vs. N trials. In addition, the greatest 
difference in performance for the monkey species was between the P vs. N and P vs.S trials. The 
greater choice for scattered faces in P vs. S compared to the choice for nonface objects in P vs. N 
also demonstrates the monkeys’ reliance on the local features of faces. Overall, the means for 
each trial type in Table 5 provide the beginning evidence that despite performing the same on 
baseline trials, monkeys and children performed differently on the test trials. 
3.4 Test – Children 
Because children who completed the first test session without the rule given to them 
differed significantly from the monkeys’ test performance, I analyzed these data separately 
(Analysis 1). First, to see whether there was a bias towards a particular stimulus class for each 
trial type, I ran six one-sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests. Children in this group selected the 
more ‘face-like’ thing in each trial type except for P vs. S trials (see Figure 3, top left, and Table 
6). Further, there was a significant correlation between age and the proportion of choices of faces 
in F vs. P trials (r(39) = 0.32, p = 0.045), indicating that older children chose greater proportions 
FvN FvP FvS PvN PvS PvX
Children Mean 0.87 0.73 0.83 0.72 0.60 0.74
(n = 40) SD 0.15 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.31 0.21
Capuchins Mean 0.84 0.82 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.54
(n = 14) SD 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.08 0.13
Rhesus Mean 0.86 0.85 0.69 0.49 0.28 0.51
(n = 7) SD 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.16
Species
Table 5. Means and standard deviations for the proportion choice for 
each trial type, separated by species. The means reflect the proportion choice 
for the stimulus labeled first in each column (for example, means reflect the 
proportion choice for F in F vs. N or the proportion choice for P in P vs. N). 
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of faces in F vs. P trials than younger children. However, no other trial types showed a relation to 
age. Further, Mann-Whitney tests revealed no significant differences for any trial type as a 
function of sex (see Table 6). A Friedman’s test revealed a significant effect of trial type (2(5) = 
 
T p r p U p
F vs. N 816.50 < 0.001* 0.24 0.15 199.0 0.99
F vs. P 674.50 < 0.001* 0.32 .045* 164.0 0.33
F vs. S 730.00 < 0.001* -0.12 0.45 186.0 0.71
P vs. N 531.00 < 0.001* -0.03 0.87 155.0 0.22
P vs. S 495.00 0.07 -0.18 0.26 190.5 0.81
P vs. X 694.00 < 0.001* 0.11 0.5 191.5 0.83
T p r p U p
F vs. N 591.50 < 0.001* 0.29 0.10 131.50 0.70
F vs. P 514.00 < 0.001* 0.42 .014* 123.00 0.49
F vs. S 518.50 < 0.001* -0.03 0.86 136.50 0.83
P vs. N 350.50 < 0.001* -0.02 0.91 128.00 0.61
P vs. S 320.00 0.292 -0.17 0.35 131.00 0.69
P vs. X 483.00 < 0.001* 0.15 0.38 107.00 0.21
Analysis 1 - All Session 1, No Rule Given (N = 40)
Trial Type
Avg. Proportion Age Sex
Trial Type
Avg. Proportion Age Sex
Analysis 2 - Session 1 Split by Rule, No Rule Group (N = 34)
T p r p U p
F vs. N 135.00 < 0.001* -0.20 0.47 29.50 0.96
F vs. P 77.50 0.11 -0.22 0.41 28.50 0.87
F vs. S 129.50 0.001* -0.29 0.27 15.50 0.08
P vs. N 136.00 < 0.001* -0.15 0.58 28.00 0.81
P vs. S 129.50 0.001* -0.36 0.17 25.00 0.57
P vs. X 136.00 < 0.001* -0.11 0.69 26.50 0.68
T p r p U p
F vs. N 1,035.00 < 0.001* 0.06 0.69 185.00 0.08
F vs. P 683.00 0.001* -0.10 0.53 189.50 0.10
F vs. S 981.00 < 0.001* 0.04 0.79 211.00 0.21
P vs. N 990.00 < 0.001* 0.02 0.87 264.00 0.99
P vs. S 851.50 < 0.001* 0.02 0.88 251.50 0.77
P vs. X 1,037.50 < 0.001* 0.06 0.69 264.00 0.99
Trial Type
Avg. Proportion Age Sex
Analysis 2 - Session 1 Split By Rule, Rule Group (N = 16)
Trial Type
Avg. Proportion Age Sex
Analysis 3 - All Session 2, Rule Given (N = 46)
Table 6. How the proportions for each trial type differed from chance 
levels, are related to age, and to sex for Analysis 1, 2, and 3 of the child data. 
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31.26, p < 0.001), indicating that the proportion of choices of the most-face like image in each 
trial type was not equivalent across trial types. The first planned comparison of interest revealed 
that children selected faces significantly more often in F vs. N trials (M = 0.87, SD = 0.15) than 
they selected pareidolia images in P vs. N trials (M  = 0.72, SD = 0.28; T = 614.50, z = -3.97, p < 
0.001; Table 7). Similarly, the second planned comparison indicated that children selected faces 
significantly more often in F vs. S trials (M = 0.83, SD = 0.19) than they selected pareidolia 
Comparison Outcome p
FvN & PvN FvN > PvN < 0.001*
FvS & PvS FvS > PvS < 0.001*
PvS & PvF PvS > PvF < 0.001*
FvP & FvN FvP < FvN < 0.001*
Comparison Outcome p
FvN & PvN FvN > FvP < 0.001*
FvS & PvS FvS > FvP < 0.001*
PvS & PvF PvS > PvF < 0.001*
FvP & FvN FvP < FvN 0.002*
Comparison Outcome p
FvN & PvN FvN = PvN 0.64
FvS & PvS FvS = PvS 0.45
PvS & PvF PvS > PvF 0.002*
FvP & FvN FvP < FvN 0.001*
Comparison Outcome p
FvN & PvN FvN = PvN 0.06
FvS & PvS FvS > FvP 0.004*
PvS & PvF PvS > PvF < 0.001*
FvP & FvN FvP < FvN < 0.001*
Analysis 1 - All Session 1, No Rule Given (N = 40)
Analysis 2 - Session 1 Split by Rule, No Rule Group (N = 34)
Analysis 2 - Session 1 Split By Rule, Rule Group (N = 16)
Analysis 3 - All Session 2, Rule Given (N = 46)
Table 7. How the proportion choices for face and 
pareidolia images were different or equivalent across trial 
types included in the planned comparisons. 
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images in P vs. S trials (M = 0.60, SD = 0.31; T = 38.00, z = -4.13, p < 0.001; Table 7), 
indicating that faces were selected more than pareidolia images and not selected as the most 
face-like image equivalently. However, children selected pareidolia images more often when 
they were paired with a scattered face than when they were paired with a real face (P vs. S: M = 
0.60, SD = 0.31; P vs. F: M = 0.28, SD = 0.28; T = 34.50, z = -4.61, p < 0.001), suggesting that 
the real face interfered with the selection of pareidolia images more so than scattered faces with 
only featural information. Finally, children selected faces more often when paired with nonfaces 
(M = 0.87, SD = 0.15) than when paired with pareidolia images (M = 0.73, SD = 0.28; T = 
541.50, z = -3.71, p < 0.001; Table 7). This demonstrates that the ability to select faces in these 
trial types was impacted more by pareidolia images than by nonface objects.  
 
Figure 3. The average proportion choice for faces in F vs. N, F vs. P, and F vs. S 
trials and the average proportion choice for pareidolia images in P vs. N, P vs. S, and P vs. X 
trials for all children analyses. “*” denotes a trial type in which the proportion choice that 
differed from chance.  
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Because several children were unable to pass training without the aid of the rule, I then 
explicitly told children the rule on their re-attempt of session one, and I provided the rule for all 
children on their second session. When looking at the verbal responses from children after the 
training phases, a large percentage of responses from children who were not given the rule did 
not indicate a clear comprehension of the 
‘face’ rule (Figure 4, top). In fact, the 
majority of children responded that they 
selected monkeys and/or people when the 
experimenter did not tell them the rule. 
However, in all sessions where the rule was 
provided, the majority of children stated rules 
that included mentioning the selection of 
faces (Figure 4, bottom). Therefore, there was 
concern that the children in Analysis 1 were 
relying on a rule other than ‘faces’ to reach 
criterion in the training phase. If this is true, 
then children who comprehended the rule as 
‘monkeys and/or people’ might bias them 
against selecting a face-like object over the 
scattered images or images that contain the 
local features of people and/or monkey faces and body parts.  
 
Figure 4. Verbal statements of 
rules/strategies by children with and 
without the rule explicitly told to them 
before training. Top: N = 44; Bottom: N = 
59. 
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To see whether rule comprehension influenced performance with the images presented in 
the first test session (Analysis 2), I ran Mann-Whitney U tests for each trial type to examine 
whether groups that differed on rule comprehension influenced performance differently. The first 
group was composed of the children who passed into test without the rule but did not correctly 
state the rule (N = 34). The second group was made up of the children who were given the rule 
on their first session because they failed to meet criterion without the rule on their first attempt 
and the children who were not given the rule on their first attempt but correctly stated it (correct 
statement of the rule had to include a mention of choosing ‘faces’ or ‘heads’; N = 16). It is 
important to note that despite 17 sessions resulting in a failure to pass without the rule, only 10 
of those children successfully completed a following session with the rule given. One child never 
completed a session following their first attempt. One case was an experimenter error in which a 
child was not told the rule for the second session and resulted in a failure to pass to test. Three 
children did not fully complete the first session where the rule was given and were thus removed 
from analysis. Two children failed the first session even when the rule was given on the second 
attempt. However, six children in total were able to state the rule correctly without it being 
explicitly given to them, which brought the sample size for this group to 16.  
 The Mann-Whitney tests revealed that there was no effect of rule on the proportion 
choice of faces for the trial types F vs. N (No Rule: M = 0.86, SD = 0.15; Rule: M = 0.91, SD = 
0.15; U = 201.50, z = -1.48, p = 0.14), F vs. P (No Rule: M = 0.73, SD = 0.28; Rule: M =0.61, SD 
= 0.25; U = 187.50, z = -1.78, p = 0.08) and F vs. S (No Rule: M = 0.81, SD = 0.19; Rule: M = 
0.84, SD = 0.25; U = 219.00, z = -1.14, p = 0.25; see Figure 3, bottom left, and Figure 3, top 
right). This is to be expected since children who either comprehend the rule as “faces” or 
“monkeys and/or people” should perform similarly on these trials given that they all met the 
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training criterion. There was a significant effect of rule for the proportion choice of the pareidolia 
images in trial types P vs. N (No Rule: M = 0.68, SD = 0.20; Rule: M = 0.89, SD = 0.15; U = 
103.50, z = -3.55, p < 0.001) , P vs. S (No Rule: M = 0.56, SD = 0.32; Rule: M = 0.81, SD = 0.26; 
U = 140.50, z = -2.76, p = 0.006), and P vs. X (No Rule: M = 0.71, SD = 0.21; Rule: M = 0.90, 
SD = 0.13; U = 107.50, z = -3.48, p = 0.001; Figure 3, bottom left, and Figure 3, top right). 
Children who were not given the rule did not select pareidolia images as often in these trial types 
as children who were given the rule or correctly stated the rule. 
I then ran one-sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests for each group to examine whether 
performance differed from chance on any given trial type. Children in the No Rule group 
selected the more ‘face-like’ thing in each trial type except for P vs. S trials (see Table 6). This 
tells us that despite not choosing pareidolia images as often as children who were given the rule 
on P vs. N or P vs. X trials, children still chose these images significantly more often than 
chance. Further, children in the No Rule group performed at chance levels on the P vs. S trial 
type – indicating that, despite the features of a face of the features of “monkeys and/or people” 
being present, these children were equally likely to select pareidolia images that lacked these 
features. Overall, these results indicate that children in the non-rule group were perceiving face 
pareidolia, but to a lesser extent than children who were given or stated the correct rule. It is also 
important to note that, similar to the first analysis, older children showed greater proportions of 
choice of faces in F vs. P trials (r(33) = 0.42, p = 0.014), but there was no relationship between 
age and proportion for any other trial type. There was also no effect of sex on performance for 
any of the trial types in this group (see Table 6). As expected, the planned comparisons revealed 
similar results as the analysis above of all children that were not given the rule (see Table 7). 
Children in the No Rule group selected faces significantly more often in F vs. N trials (M = 0.86, 
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SD = 0.15) than they selected pareidolia images in P vs. N trials (M = 0.68, SD = 0.20; T = 
468.00, z = -3.82, p < 0.001). Similarly, the second planned comparison indicated that children in 
the No Rule group selected faces significantly more often in F vs. S trials (M = 0.81, SD = 0.19) 
than they selected pareidolia images in P vs. S trials (M = 0.56, SD = 0.32; T = 20.50, z = -3.83, p 
< 0.001). However, children selected pareidolia images more often when they were paired with a 
scattered face than when they were paired with a real face (P vs. S: M = 0.56, SD  = 0.32; P vs. 
F: M = 0.27, SD = 0.28; T = 34.50, z = -4.09, p < 0.001). Finally, children in the No Rule group 
selected faces more often when paired with nonface objects (M = 0.85, SD = 0.15) than when 
paired with pareidolia images (M = 0.73, SD = 0.28; T = 380.50, z = -3.05, p = 0.002; Table 7). 
Overall, even when children failed to articulate the correct rule, they selected pareidolia images 
more often than chance when they were paired with either a nonface object or a scattered 
pareidolia image, revealing that the configurations of the pareidolia images were perceived as 
more face-like. Similarly, they chose faces more often when they were paired with nonface 
objects rather than the pareidolia images, indicating that the face-like configuration of pareidolia 
images interfered with their performance to always choose real faces. However, children did not 
show a bias for selecting pareidolia images when they were paired with scattered faces, 
indicating that the featural aspects of the face resulted in equivalent decisions to select those 
images. These results match those in Analysis 1, before children were separated into groups of 
rule comprehension.  
However, for children who either correctly articulated the rule or were given the rule 
(Rule group), their selection for the more face-like image in each trial type was significant for all 
trial types except for F vs. P trials (see Table 6). There was no relationship between age and 
these choice proportions for any of the trial types, nor was there an effect of sex (Table 6). 
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Planned comparisons for this group revealed that children selected faces in F vs. N trials (M = 
0.91, SD = 0.15) just as often as they selected pareidolia images in P vs. N trials (M = 0.89, SD = 
0.15; T = 60.00, z = -0.47, p = 0.64), and they selected faces in F vs. S (M = 0.84, SD = 0.25) 
trials just as often as they selected pareidolia in P vs. S trials (M = 0.81, SD = 0.22; T = 24.50, z  
= -0.76, p = 0.45; Table 7). Children in the Rule group selected pareidolia images significantly 
more often in the P vs. S (M = 0.81, SD = 0.22) trials than in the P vs. F trials (M = 0.39, SD = 
0.25; T = 3.00, z = -3.12, p = 0.002), and they selected faces more often in the F vs. N trials (M = 
0.91, SD = 0.15) than in the F vs. P trials (M = 0.61, SD = 0.25; T = 120.00, z = -3.41, p = 0.001; 
Table 7). The key differences here are revealed in these first two comparisons. Children who 
were given or correctly stated the rule treated faces just like pareidolia images when those 
images were paired with either nonface objects or scattered faces. However, regardless of rule, 
children chose pareidolia images more often when paired with a scattered face than a real face 
and chose faces more often when they were paired with a nonface object rather than a pareidolia 
image (Table 7).  
Taken together, children experienced pareidolia regardless of rule comprehension. 
However, children who were explicitly told to select images that look like faces showed an even 
stronger bias towards selecting pareidolia images in all trial types that those images appeared, 
reflecting that they were better at selecting images based on the configural information. 
However, even without the rule, pareidolia images were selected above chance levels when 
paired with nonface objects and scattered pareidolia images, but just as much as the scattered 
faces. Therefore, there was still a bias towards selecting these illusory faces without explicit rule 
comprehension.  
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These results were replicated by examining the second test sessions, in which the rule 
was given to all children (Analysis 3; N = 46). Because the data were non-normally distributed 
for each trial type, I used a Friedman Test to assess for an effect of trial type, and that test 
indicated that the proportions of each trial type differed significantly (2(5) = 25.09, p < 0.001; 
Figure 3, bottom right). To understand how the proportions of each trial type differed, I then 
conducted six one-sided Mann-Whitney U tests to assess for biases in each trial type. For 
children in their second test session, with the rule given, they chose the more ‘face-like’ image of 
each trial type significantly more often than chance (see Table 6). There was no effect of sex on 
the proportions chosen for any trial types, nor was there a relationship between age and 
performance for any trial type (see Table 6). This reflects a slight difference from the biases seen 
in the Rule group of session 1, in which children did not show a bias for selecting faces in F vs. 
P. However, when the proportions for the Rule group in the first test session were compared to 
the proportions in the second session, there were no significant differences between the groups 
for each trial type (see Figures 3, top right and 3, bottom right). 
 Next, six Wilcoxon signed ranks tests were run to assess the comparisons of interest, 
three of which were significant following a Bonferroni correction (Table 7). Children chose faces 
in F vs. S trials (M = 0.86, SD = 0.19) more often than they chose pareidolia images in P vs. S 
trials (M = 0.76, SD = 0.28; T = 104.00, z = -2.86, p = 0.004). However, the proportion of 
choices of faces in F vs. N trials (M = 0.91, SD = 0.29) was greater than the proportion of 
choices of pareidolia images in P vs. N trials (M = 0.88, SD = 0.13), although it was not 
significantly different (T = 548.00, z = -1.86, p = 0.06). The final two comparisons revealed that 
children chose pareidolia images more often in P vs. S trials than in P vs. F trials (P vs. S: M = 
0.76, SD = 0.28; P vs. F: M = 0.33, SD = 0.29; T = 14.00, z = -5.41, p < 0.001) and that children 
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chose faces more often in F vs. N trials than in F vs. P trials (F vs. N: M = 0.92, SD = 0.10; F vs. 
P: M = 0.67, SD = 0.29; T = 930.00, z = -5.08, p < 0.001; Table 7). Overall, the results from 
session 2 closely resemble those from the children in the Rule group of session 1 – revealing a 
strong bias for selecting faces closely followed by a bias for selecting pareidolia images (Figures 
3, top right and 3, bottom right). 
3.5 Test – Monkeys  
Because there were no significant differences between the monkey species for any trial 
types, I analyzed the rhesus and capuchin data together. Despite sufficient power (N = 21), I used 
non-parametric tests to analyze the monkey data to keep tests consistent with the kid data and 
because some of the outcome measures violated assumptions of normality. A Friedman test 
revealed a significant effect of trial type (2(5) = 91.88, p < 0.001; Figure 5). Using One-sample 
Wilcoxon signed rank tests to look at individual trial types, monkeys performed differently from 
Figure 5. The average proportion choice for faces in F vs. N, F vs. P, 
and F vs. S trials and the average proportion choice for pareidolia images in 
P vs. N, P vs. S, and P vs. X trials for rhesus and capuchin monkey test trials, 
combined. “*” denotes a trial type in which the proportion choice differed 
from chance. 
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chance on four trial types. They selected faces more often than chance on F vs. N trials, F vs. P 
trials, and F vs. S trials. Additionally, monkeys selected pareidolia images significantly less often 
than chance on P vs. S trials. On P vs. N and P vs. X trials monkeys performed at chance levels, 
showing no bias to pick one stimulus over the other (see Table 8).  
When examining the planned comparisons, monkeys selected faces in F vs. N trials (M = 
0.84, SD = 0.07) significantly more often than they selected pareidolia images in P vs. N trials 
(M = 0.50, SD = 0.07; T = 231.00, z  = -4.02, p < 0.001; Table 9). They also selected faces in F 
vs. S trials (M = 0.69, SD = 0.13) significantly more often than they selected pareidolia images in 
P vs. S trials (M = 0.29, SD = 0.08; T = 0.00, z = -4.02, p < 0.001). Monkeys selected pareidolia 
images significantly more often when paired with a scattered face (P vs. S: M = 0.29, SD = 0.08) 
than when paired with a real face (P vs. F: M = 0.17, SD = 0.08; T = 1.00, z = -3.99, p < 0.001). 
This comparison indicated that there was a slightly weaker preference for choosing scrambled 
T p r p U p r p
F vs. N 231.00 < .001* -0.33 0.25 10.00 0.16 -0.76 0.049*
F vs. P 231.00 < .001* -0.06 0.84 14.00 0.39 -0.62 0.14
F vs. S 190.00 < .001* -0.23 0.42 14.00 0.39 -0.63 0.13
P vs. N 70.00 0.756 -0.59 0.026* 12.00 0.25 -0.43 0.34
P vs. S 0.00 < .001* -0.19 0.53 9.50 0.13 -0.13 0.77
P vs. X 113.00 0.468 -0.11 0.72 19.00 0.89 -0.49 0.27
Rhesus Age
Trial Type
Capuchin Age Capuchin SexAvg. Proportion
Table 8. How the proportions for each trial type differed from chance levels, are 
related to age, and to sex for all rhesus and capuchin test data. "*" denotes a value that 
is statistically significant. 
Comparison Outcome p
FvN & PvN FvN > PvN < 0.001*
FvS & PvS FvS > PvS < 0.001*
PvS & PvF PvS > PvF < 0.001*
FvP & FvN FvP = FvN 0.285
Table 9. How the proportion choices for 
face and pareidolia images were different or 
equivalent across trial types included in the 
planned comparisons of the monkey data. 
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images against pareidolia images than choosing real faces, but the individual bias towards 
choosing scrambled faces in the P vs. S trial type was still above chance levels. There was no 
difference in the proportion of choices for faces among the F vs. N trials (M = 0.84, SD = 0.07) 
and the F vs. P trials (M = 0.83, SD = 0.10; T = 110.00, z = -1.07, p = 0.29). This comparison 
indicates that monkeys perceived the pareidolia images similarly to how they perceived the 
nonface objects, as reflected in the similar proportions across these two trial types (see Table 9). 
In general, there were few effects of sex and age in the monkeys (see Table 8). Because 
all rhesus subjects were males, I only examined the relation between age and the proportions of 
stimulus choices for each trial type. There was a negative correlation between age and the 
proportion chosen for all trial types, but the only significant relation was for the F vs. N trial 
type. Therefore, the older rhesus monkeys chose a smaller proportion of faces in this trial type. 
For capuchin monkeys, there was no effect of sex on any trial type. However, older capuchin 
monkeys chose a smaller proportion of pareidolia images in P vs. N trials but there was no 
relationship of age and performance on any other trial types (Table 8). Overall, it is unlikely that 
there are age or sex effects on performance in this task for monkeys. 
Finally, to illustrate better the difference between monkeys and children’s bias towards 
selecting pareidolia images, I plotted each pareidolia image and the percentage of trials in which 
it was selected for each species (see Figures 6a-6c). These graphs demonstrate that children were 
more likely to select pareidolia images than either monkey species, where the likelihood of 
selecting a pareidolia image was largely below 50 percent. Further, there was no relation 
between the frequencies at which children and either species of monkey selected these images 
(children and capuchin monkeys: r(79) = .11, p = .32; children and rhesus monkeys: r(79) = .05, 
p = .66). I also looked at how frequently all species selected the nonface object images. Because 
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a portion of these images included capuchin, rhesus, and human body parts (184 stimuli/species 
from a total of 2,080 nonface object stimuli), I wanted to assess whether monkeys and children 
Figure 6a-6c. The percentage that each individual 
pareidolia stimulus was selected across each species (6a: 
children, 6b: capuchin monkeys, 6c: rhesus monkeys). 
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may have been more likely to choose these specific images, especially if the conceptual ‘rule’ 
they were using during the test phase was to select monkeys and/or people rather than faces. 
Only one nonface image was selected by capuchins >64% of the time it appeared in the task. 
This particular image was of a capuchin body. Of the seven rhesus monkeys tested, 5 out of 7 
chose the same 9 nonface object stimuli. However, these stimuli were composed of random 
objects, rhesus body parts, and capuchin body parts. It is likely that such a small number of these 
images being selected by the majority of subjects is due to chance. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
monkeys were biased towards selecting specific nonface images, particularly toward images that 
contained body parts. 
4 DISCUSSION 
All species that were tested successfully passed the required pre-test and training phases. 
Children did not show a pre-existing bias towards selecting faces, despite evidence that children, 
from a young age, prefer to look at faces and face-like stimuli (Dupierrix et al., 2014; Farroni et 
al., 2005; Goren et al., 1975). In fact, many of the children chose nonface objects more than 
faces, when asked to choose one of the two images. Therefore, the children’s choice behavior did 
not match that of their looking preference towards faces. Additionally, these results suggest that 
children’s success in passing the training phase in the computerized task is a result of a specific 
strategy or rule used by children to select those images, rather than reflecting a pre-existing 
looking preference. 
The monkeys underwent a matching-to-sample pre-test to provide sufficient experience 
and reinforcement with each type of stimulus. This test was intended to provide a reinforcement 
history for each image type so as not to result in a bias to avoid certain stimuli that only appeared 
in the test phase. For example, without the pre-test, monkeys may have avoided the selection of 
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scattered images having never encountered them throughout the training or generalization 
phases. From the results of the test data, it appears that monkeys did not avoid scattered images. 
In fact, monkeys chose scattered faces at levels above chance in P vs. S trials and chose scattered 
pareidolia images just as often as the non-scattered pareidolia images in P vs. X trials (Figure 5). 
During the training phase, the two species of monkeys were required to pass more 
stringent training and generalization phases than the training phase the children were given. Not 
only did they pass a training phase by reaching a criterion of 80% on 40 trials, but they also had 
to generalize the rule to novel stimuli in a generalization phase. Additionally, the majority of 
monkeys maintained this rule immediately and throughout all 2,000 trials in the test phase (Table 
3). Monkeys did not preferentially select nonface images that contained body parts or turned 
heads of monkeys, providing further evidence that the strategy they were using involved 
selecting faces and not another strategy such as selecting monkeys and people. Even throughout 
the test trials the monkeys remained particularly biased towards selecting faces, showing choices 
of faces at levels above chance levels in F vs. N, F vs. P and F vs. S trials. Taken together, 
monkeys were likely using a strategy consistent with the goal of this project (to select images 
with faces). 
I initially proposed a series of 3 X 2 mixed ANOVAs with species as a between-subjects 
factor and trial types as within-subjects to assess for species differences for the specific trial type 
pairs I examined in post-hoc analyses. I hypothesized that no species differences would occur 
and that pareidolia images would be selected at similar rates across all trial types. Instead, I ran a 
Kruskal-Wallis test with species as the grouping factor and all six trial types as the dependent 
variables to assess for an overall species difference across every trial type. There was a species 
difference for four trial types: F vs. S, P vs. N, P vs. S, and P vs. X. Running the analyses this 
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way allowed me to detect species differences in trial types that would not have occurred in the 
planned comparisons initially proposed. This analysis also allowed me to compare all trial types 
among the two species of monkeys. This comparison showed that there were no significant 
differences in the proportions for any trial type, allowing me to collapse across the species of 
monkeys and analyze their data together.   
There were no overall species differences for F vs. N and F vs. P trial types. All species 
chose faces at a level above chance for these two trial types, further suggesting that all subjects 
maintained performance on baseline trials but also chose faces more often than chance even 
when paired with pareidolia images. However, it is important to note that although children 
chose faces above chance levels in both of these trial types, they chose faces significantly more 
often in F vs. N trials than they did in F vs. P trials, as hypothesized above. This suggests that, 
whereas faces were consistently selected in these trials, the face-like configuration of the 
pareidolia images was interfering with the children’s performance on F vs. P trials. Monkeys, on 
the other hand, chose faces equivalently across these trial types, suggesting that the face-like 
configuration of the pareidolia images did not interfere with their performance and providing 
evidence that monkeys may not perceive these images as being face-like.  
Further, many interesting species differences occurred in trial types that did not present a 
face stimulus. Monkeys performed at chance on P vs. N and P vs. X trials. Monkeys chose 
pareidolia images significantly less often than chance levels on P vs. S. trials, contradictory to 
what I originally hypothesized. This suggests that monkeys are judging the nonface images 
similarly to the scattered pareidolia images. The scattered pareidolia images, that lack the facial 
configuration present in the pareidolia images, are chosen at similar rates as nonface objects 
when they are paired with pareidolia, confirming that this lack of local and configural facial 
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information results in a similar level of selection of the nonface images in these trial types. 
Monkeys showed a bias that was opposite of what I initially hypothesized, choosing the scattered 
faces images more often than chance levels when paired with a pareidolia image. Overall, 
monkeys’ choice behavior on these three trial types provide further evidence that monkeys do 
not perceive the pareidolia images as face-like – choosing them just as often as nonface object 
images and less often than images that contain local facial features but not the facial 
configuration. Therefore, it appears that the monkeys favor the local face information in 
scattered faces over the configural information in the pareidolia images. However, it is also 
interesting to note that, even though the scattered faces were chosen above chance in P vs. S 
trials, monkeys still chose faces more often than chance in F vs. S trials, suggesting that real 
faces (with the accurate configuration of local features) were still favored over scrambled faces 
(with only local features).  
The children’s test sessions that were included in the overall species analysis were those 
children who passed the training phase without the aid of the being given the rule. I excluded 
sessions in which children were given the rule in order to compare test sessions across species in 
the most equivalent manner. Similarly, I wanted to use sessions in which children used their own 
strategies to pass the training phase and complete the test phase. On the trials that differed from 
monkeys (F vs. S, P vs. N, P vs. S, and P vs. X) trials, children selected the most face-like thing 
in each trial type based on configural properties. Children, like monkeys, chose faces 
significantly more than chance in F vs. S trials. However, children’s average choice of faces in F 
vs. S was higher than that for monkeys. This suggests that children may have been more efficient 
than monkeys at ignoring the scrambled facial features in scattered faces in favor of selecting the 
face more often in these trial types. The most striking differences between children and monkeys, 
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however, lies in the trial types in which faces were not presented. Whereas monkeys selected 
pareidolia images at or below chance for these trials, children selected pareidolia images 
significantly above chance levels in P vs. N and P vs. X trials and performed at chance levels for 
P vs. S trials. That is, without being given the rule, children chose pareidolia images more often 
than images that did not have any facial information (nonface and scattered pareidolia images), 
showing that the face-like configuration of the pareidolia images likely influenced their 
performance. However, children performed at chance on trials that displayed images with no 
local, but configural information (pareidolia images) against images that had local but no 
configural information (scattered face images). Overall, their performance on these three trials 
indicated that children did perceive these images as having face-like information. What is also 
important to note is that children showed equivalent choice for the global and local information 
in the P vs. S trials. Despite children selecting the scattered faces equivalently to pareidolia 
images, it is also important to point out that they were less influenced by the local/featural 
information of the scattered faces than the monkeys, who consistently preferred these images 
over pareidolia images. Overall, despite the evidence that children experienced face pareidolia, 
local information played clearly played a role in children’s decision-making process in this task. 
To summarize, these data do not support my initial hypotheses that there would be no 
overall species differences across the test trials presented. The children’s choice behavior on 
each trial type confirms five of my initial hypothesis and rejects one. Children selected faces 
significantly more than chance on F vs. N trials, F vs. P trials, and F vs. S trials. Children also 
selected pareidolia significantly more than chance in P vs. N and P vs. X trials However, 
children did not select pareidolia more than chance in P vs. S trials. Alternatively, the monkeys’ 
choice behavior also confirms my initial hypotheses surrounding F vs. N, F vs. P, and F vs. S. 
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However, monkeys’ performance on P vs. N, P vs. S, and P vs. X trials do not support my initial 
hypotheses and, instead, suggest that monkeys do not perceive face pareidolia. As part of these 
hypotheses, I proposed that monkeys and children would not perform at chance at F vs. S or P 
vs. X which would indicate that they were not using a strategy of avoiding nonface objects. Both 
species did select faces above chance in F vs. S trials, and children selected pareidolia image 
above chance levels in P vs. X. If children had been using a strategy to avoid nonface images, 
they would have performed at chance levels in P vs. X, so these results suggest that they were 
using a strategy to select images that did contain a face-like configuration. On the other hand, 
monkeys did perform at chance levels on P vs. X. Despite this, it is unlikely monkeys were using 
a nonface avoidance strategy, especially given their preference for selecting whole faces over 
scattered faces.   
I also hypothesized that the proportion of choices of faces and of pareidolia images would 
be the same when comparing P vs. N to F vs. N trials and when comparing F vs. S to P vs. S 
trials. However, the data for the children and for the monkeys did not support either of these 
hypotheses. Instead, children’s and monkeys’ proportions of choices of faces in F vs. N and F vs. 
S was greater than the proportions of choices of pareidolia images in P vs. N and P vs. S, 
respectively. Although children chose pareidolia images significantly above chance in P vs. N 
and P vs. X trials, they did not choose them equivalently to how they chose faces in F vs. N and 
F vs. S. However, these data are still consistent with children perceiving face pareidolia. As 
described above, humans perceive these images as face-like, but can make a decision that they 
are not so face-like to be mistaken for real faces. Therefore, despite perceiving these images as 
more face-like than objects, children do not choose pareidolia at equivalent rates as real faces.  
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For the third comparison of interest, I hypothesized that children and monkeys would 
select pareidolia images significantly more often in P vs. S trials than in P vs. F trials. 
Confirming this hypothesis would suggest that pareidolia images are perceived, or selected as, 
more face-like when paired with scattered faces than when paired with a real face. The data from 
the children and the monkeys supported this hypothesis. All species chose pareidolia 
significantly more often when paired with an image that contained only the local features of a 
face then when it was paired with a whole face image. It is important to remember that monkeys 
chose scattered faces significantly above levels of chance when paired with a pareidolia image. 
So, it is likely that the results of this particular comparison are driven by the scattered face image 
being selected less often than faces rather than the pareidolia image being perceived as face-like, 
and thus selected more often in P vs. S.  
For the final comparison of interest, I hypothesized that faces would be chosen 
significantly more often in F vs. N trials than in F vs. P trials. Confirming this hypothesis would 
indicate that the face-like configuration of pareidolia images interfered with participants’ 
decisions toward selecting face images, relative to when faces were paired with an image that 
lacked a face-like configuration. The data from the children confirmed this hypothesis, but the 
monkeys chose faces equivalently in F vs. P and F vs. N trials. This provides further evidence 
that children’s ability to select faces was influenced by pareidolia images, relative to nonface 
objects, and that monkeys were not influenced by the pareidolia images in a similar way. 
Overall, these data suggest that monkeys do not judge the pareidolia images similarly to how 
they judge real faces. Instead, monkeys are proficient at selecting faces in trials in which they 
appear and are influenced by the local facial features in scattered face images. The same is true 
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for children, but children also appear to perceive pareidolia images as being face-like, which is 
reflected in their choices across all trial types.  
Because there were so many children that failed to pass training in sessions where no rule 
was provided and because many of the children that did pass training without the rule did not 
correctly state the rule as involving faces, I ran separate analyses to understand the difference 
that comprehending or being told the rule had on performance. In general, the data revealed that 
explicitly stating and/or being told the rule resulted in more pronounced results in support of 
experiencing face pareidolia. More specifically, children in the No Rule group differed from 
children in the Rule group on P vs. N, P vs. S, and P vs. X trial types, but not on trial types in 
which faces were presented. This could have been driven in part by the large number of children 
who stated the rule as choosing images of people and/or monkeys. However, even without the 
rule, pareidolia images were selected above chance levels when paired with nonface objects and 
scattered pareidolia images, but just as much as the scattered faces. Therefore, there was still a 
bias towards selecting these illusory faces without explicit rule comprehension. 
Like children in the initial analysis, children in the no rule group selected the more face-
like image above chance levels in each trial type except for P vs. S. However, children in the 
Rule group selected the more face-like image above chance levels in each trial type except for P 
vs. F trials. Overall, children who were either explicitly told or correctly stated the rule showed 
an increased choice for pareidolia images in P vs. N, P vs. S, P vs. X, and F vs. P trial types 
compared to the children in the No Rule group. Explicit comprehension of the rule resulted in 
children being more sensitive to the global configuration of the pareidolia images. This was also 
true for all children on their second test session when they were all given the rule regardless of 
whether they received the rule in their first session. Taken together, children experience face 
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pareidolia regardless of rule comprehension, but the aid of the rule results in a greater sensitivity 
to the configural properties of the pareidolia images. 
Another point of interest is the relation between age and the proportion of choices of 
faces found in the two analyses in which I analyzed all children’s first test session without the 
rule (Analysis 1) and the subsequent analysis in which I split the children into groups based on 
their rule comprehension (Analysis 2, No Rule group). Older children in these analyses were 
more likely than younger children to choose greater proportions of faces in F vs. P trials. Older 
children are typically more efficient at processing images using global information. However, 
this alone does not explain why older children may be better at ignoring the global face-like 
configuration of pareidolia images than younger children. Perhaps this relationship results from 
greater ability to inhibit the selecting the face-like pareidolia image in favor of the real face. 
Future work on the perception of face pareidolia in children could focus on replicating and 
understanding the relationship between age and inhibition and how that plays a role in judging 
these images as face-like.  
Overall, despite a preference towards looking at faces and face-like stimuli (Sugita, 2008; 
Taubert et al., 2017), it appears that monkeys to not perceive or judge examples of face 
pareidolia as face-like whereas children do, and they do even without the aid of an explicitly 
stated instruction to do so. The goal of this project was to understand whether the perception of 
face pareidolia, at a later-processing, decision-making level occurs across multiple species of 
primates beyond an implicit attraction to faces and face-like stimuli that occurs at an early, pre-
decision making stage. The results of this experiment suggest that monkeys, after successfully 
learning to choose faces over other stimuli and generalize that rule to novel images, do not 
generalize this behavior to images that include a face-like configuration but lack the local 
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features of a face. Instead, monkeys remain sensitive to the local information present in scattered 
face images. Alternatively, children do seem to be influenced by the configural information 
found in pareidolia images, selecting them above chance relative to objects, and equivalently to 
faces when explicitly guided to select images that look like faces. However, even though these 
data suggest that children perceive face pareidolia, there is still evidence that the local, featural 
information in scattered faces is playing an integral role in their perception and judgement of 
what is ‘face-like.’ This is apparent in trials such as P vs. S in which children, who were not 
given the rule, selected these images equivalently.  
Therefore, despite children and monkey species being similarly proficient in 
discriminating images based on local and global information, the illusion of face pareidolia 
reveals an important species difference in these processing strategies. The face-like configuration 
of pareidolia images results in a stronger bias in children to select images that have configural 
face information over just the local information. On the other hand, monkeys consistently favor 
the local face information in scattered face stimuli over the configural information in pareidolia 
images. One explanation for this difference in processing strategy is experience. Humans, even 
from a young age, are often exposed to many forms of anthropomorphization. Many children 
grow up watching television in which objects and animals act, speak, and look like humans. This 
exposure to seeing and recognizing faces in objects could result in an increased sensitivity to 
extracting these patterns and explicitly recognizing something as face-like in our environment. 
Previous researchers have investigated whether cultural factors influence the perception and 
processing of faces and face pareidolia (Pavlova et al., 2018). Additionally, the perception of 
face pareidolia has been found to be influenced by one’s religious or paranormal beliefs (Riekki 
et al., 2013). For example, paranormal believers were better at detecting pareidolia faces but also 
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more prone to false alarms in nonface pictures, consistent with reports that individuals with 
paranormal beliefs are more likely to extract meaningful patterns out of objectively meaningless 
stimuli (Riekki et al., 2013; Zhou & Meng, 2019). It is possible that individuals with greater 
religious and/or paranormal beliefs, and thus more liberal criteria for detecting illusory faces, 
have greater imaginative ability that plays a large role in detecting these patterns. Therefore, 
children with exposure to anthropomorphization may be more sensitive to detecting these 
patterns elsewhere, and this could explain why children were biased towards selecting images 
that resembled faces. In other words, children’s experience, and resulting imagination and ability 
to recognize these patterns, allows them to efficiently generalize face-like patterns to other 
stimuli whereas monkeys do not. If these experiences do play an important role in the perception 
of face pareidolia, future research should focus on understanding how different levels of 
anthropomorphism are reflected in individual differences in children. For example, do children 
with limited experiences watching cartoons and movies struggle to perceive face pareidolia 
relative to children with greater exposure to these types of media.  
It is important to note that, whereas experience and/or beliefs plays a role in children’s 
exceptional ability at perceiving and selecting face pareidolia images, it not just these factors that 
allow for the perception of face pareidolia. Despite the many factors that can shape the degree to 
which someone perceives pareidolia, evidence for sensitivity towards faces and face-like patterns 
is apparent from infancy. I argue that this innate sensitivity to faces and face-like patterns (that is 
shared across species of primates) predisposes humans to generalize these patterns to other visual 
inputs in our environment through mechanisms such as cultural beliefs and experience (such as 
exposure to anthropomorphism through media), that are not shared across species of primates. 
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Overall, the perception of face pareidolia is likely an interaction and a balance of bottom-
up and top-down, experience-driven processes. In other words, the bottom-up sensitivity towards 
faces provides an ideal basis for top-down, experience-driven factors to build off and make 
humans so prone to illusory face perception. As Zhou and Meng (2019) suggested, those with 
greater paranormal beliefs, who also are prone to more pareidolia ‘false alarms’ may represent 
individuals whose perception of face pareidolia is biased more towards top-down processes (that 
is, driven by beliefs and thus a greater ability to extract face-like patterns from noise). In fact, 
there are many factors that can influence the degree to which humans can detect face pareidolia 
including sex, personality, religious beliefs, mood, neurodevelopmental disorders, and more (see 
Zhou & Meng, 2019 for a review). 
Despite the many proposed top-down mechanisms that can influence face perception, 
there are very few studies that have worked to understand or replicate these effects. Only one 
study has studied the influence of culture on gender differences in this illusion, but no studies (to 
the best of my knowledge) have specifically sought out to understand cultural-based differences 
in sensitivity and detection of face pareidolia. Further, it is important to understand whether 
religious, paranormal, or other types of beliefs are influencing other areas of cognition such as 
imagination. That is, do individuals with a greater degree of visual imagination or imagery have 
a broader detection system for face-like patterns in the environment? Future research must help 
us understand the factors contributing to individual differences within humans in the perception 
of face pareidolia to further help us understand how these factors also relate to the species 
differences reported in this experiment.  
If the perception of face pareidolia in humans is driven by these various top-down 
processes, and results in an ability to generalize face-like patterns to other environmental stimuli, 
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future research should also investigate whether monkeys can be trained to be sensitive to and 
generalize these patterns to other stimuli. For example, if examples of face pareidolia are 
positively reinforced in nonhuman primates, can we train them to become more sensitive to 
generalizing, and thus detecting these configural patterns in other stimuli as well? If experience 
and reinforcement with these stimuli results in a greater sensitivity to detecting face-like patterns, 
this would further suggest that the perception of face pareidolia is both a combination of the 
early, bottom-up perceptual processes and top-down influences related to experience.  
One limitation in this project is that the monkeys and children may not have been using a 
“always choose the most face-like image” during testing. As was apparent in the data from 
children, many who were not given the rule reported using a strategy that included choosing 
monkeys and/or people or were unable to state a reason or method to their strategy. Despite their 
inability to state the correct rule, however, children still demonstrated evidence of perceiving 
face pareidolia. The training regimen for the monkeys was more stringent, and the results suggest 
that they were likely using a strategy centered on selecting faces. Further, almost all monkeys 
maintained a high performance on trials where a real face was present, and there were very few 
nonface images that contained monkey and human body parts that were selected by more than 
half of the monkeys tested. Therefore, it is unlikely that monkeys were using a “monkeys and/or 
people” strategy and instead were selecting faces, but alternative strategies, such as a strategy 
based on specific low-level/featural information (shape(s), color(s), size(s), etc.), cannot be ruled 
out entirely. Given this possibility, future research should include stimuli that better control for 
certain features and can rule out strategies based solely on the selection certain features but a 
broader concept of “face.” 
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It is also important to note that the phenomenon of face pareidolia occurs on a spectrum. 
There are some examples of face pareidolia that result in a stronger experience of seeing a face 
than others, and this could vary from species to species and from individual to individual. For 
example, previous research has used stimuli ranging from hand-drawn blobs, vegetables 
arranged to look like a face on a place, the highly detailed Arcimboldo images, and those used in 
this study (see Figure 1). It is likely that the wide range of pareidolia images that have appeared 
in the literature elicit different magnitudes of face pareidolia in humans. So, it is possible that the 
stimuli used in these experiments lacked the characteristics needed to elicit a face-like 
experience in nonhuman primates. However, in Taubert and colleagues (2017) eye tracking 
study, human adults were asked to rate pareidolia examples on a 200-pt “face-like” scale to 
assure that the examples presented to the monkeys elicited pareidolia in humans. Many of the 
same stimuli in that experiment were presented to monkeys in these experiments, without a 
behavioral bias for selecting them similarly to real faces. So even if the threshold for nonhuman 
primates to perceive an image as a face or face-like is higher than the threshold needed for 
humans, this study provides strong evidence that the perception of face pareidolia is not 
ubiquitous across species. In other words, the images used as stimuli in this study elicit the 
perception of face pareidolia in humans, but not in rhesus or capuchin monkeys.  
 Future research should include a broader range of stimuli that involve various examples 
of face pareidolia to understand where the threshold occurs for nonhuman primates to experience 
an image as a face or as face-like. Comparative research on face pareidolia should strive to 
include stimulus validation from human populations, in which human adults can rate the 
magnitude of their perception of face-pareidolia. These ratings can verify and measure the degree 
to which people experience face pareidolia and can be used to understand the threshold in which 
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nonhuman primates also perceive images as faces or as face-like. The scatter-plots (Figures 6a-c) 
show that children did select most of the pareidolia images above chance whereas the monkeys, 
as a whole, were not biased towards any specific pareidolia image, thus serving as a form of 
validation that children recognized these images as face-like across various examples whereas 
monkeys did not. However, for studies that expand their stimulus set to include other “forms” of 
pareidolia (for example, Arcimboldo images, cartoons, schematic face “blobs”) these ratings 
could lend insight into comparing the thresholds at which humans and nonhuman primates begin 
to classify things as being face-like.  
Finally, future comparative research on face pareidolia should attempt to replicate the 
findings described above and include more species to understand better the phenomenon of face 
pareidolia across various species. More specifically, do species of great apes besides humans 
perceive pareidolia like humans or does their choice behavior, when selecting images of faces, 
ignore the configural information in pareidolia images similarly as monkeys. Chimpanzees, like 
humans, typically show a global processing strategy when discriminating stimuli, so perhaps 
they will be more sensitive to the face-like configuration of these images. Researchers should 
also remain open to others forms of measuring the perception of face pareidolia in nonhuman 
primates. For example, Flessert and Beran (in prep) have developed a computerized task that 
trains monkeys to place stimuli into different categorical “bins” that represent a pseudo-
continuum, or a form of a ratings scale. It is a goal for this project to train nonhuman primates 
quickly to generalize and apply novel stimuli to this ratings scale. Therefore, future work 
investigating the illusion of face pareidolia can expand on these results by attempting to train 
monkeys accurately to categorize faces and nonface objects on either end of the scale and then 
introducing and studying where monkeys place pareidolia images on the scale. 
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Beyond studying visual perception at a comparative level, studying illusory face 
perception in clinical settings can pave the way for better understanding certain social disorders 
in which there are specific deficits in face perception such as prosopagnosia, autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD), schizophrenia, Williams syndrome, Capgras syndrome, and Turner syndrome 
(Anaki et al., 2016; Annaz et al., 2009; Barrelle & Luauté, 2017; Barton, 2003; Lazar et al., 
2014; Megreya, 2016; Morin et al., 2015; Pavlova et al., 2016; Walker et al., 1984). Studying 
face pareidolia in these groups also can improve our understanding for how bottom-up 
processing of global and local features interacts with top-down, experience-driven factors. 
Specifically, several of these disorders are marked by a deficit or an inability to process faces 
holistically, and therefore accurately recognize faces. For example, individuals with ASD, 
schizophrenia, Williams syndrome, or prosopagnosia typically show a local processing bias 
(Avidan et al., 2011; Happé & Frith, 2006; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004; Morin et al., 2015; 
Watson, 2013). However, tests with Navon-style stimuli consistently show that individuals with 
ASD have intact holistic processing or equivalent reliance on global and local properties of these 
images (Behrmann et al., 2006; Brosnan et al., 2004; Mottron et al., 1999; Plaisted et al., 1999). 
Additionally, individuals with ASD are still sensitive to tests of holistic face processing, such as 
the inversion effect (Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Lahaie et al., 2006; Scherf et al., 2008; Tavares et 
al., 2016; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003). Therefore, people with social disorders such as those 
mentioned above represent important samples because they represent groups in which many of 
the human-unique experiences (such as anthropomorphism exposure) are shared with typically 
developing populations, but also have differences in global and local processing of stimuli. 
Currently, few studies have investigated how non-typically developing individuals perceive 
illusory faces. In one experiment, preschool age children with ASD struggled to attend and orient 
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towards face-like stimuli compared to typically developing (TD) controls. However, looking 
time between upright and inverted face-like objects showed no difference between TD or ASD 
individuals, suggesting that holistic processing played a role in allowing children with ASD to 
perceive illusory faces with a deficit in efficiently attending to these stimuli (Guillon et al., 
2016). Another experiment also reported the perception of face-like objects in individuals with 
ASD (Akechi et al., 2015). However, several studies have reported marked deficits in illusory 
face perception in individuals with ASD and individuals with Williams syndrome (Pavlova et al., 
2016, 2017; Ryan et al., 2016). Therefore, more research is needed to understand how 
individuals with various face processing deficits perceive and process these images.  
The perception of face pareidolia is not common across all species of primates. It is 
possible that this illusion is unique to humans and a result of the tendency to anthropomorphize 
objects and animals in everyday life. Further research is needed to understand better whether 
face pareidolia occurs in other species, such as chimpanzees, to understand how large a role a 
global-processing precedence may play in the perception of face pareidolia. Overall, the results 
reported above represent an important first-step in understanding the role experience plays in 
shaping human perception and lays the groundwork for future research to continue studying how 
bottom-up and top-down perceptual processing work together to create various perceptual 
phenomena.   
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